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II. THE UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS OF
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN CIVIL
PROCEDURE:
THE EXAMPLE OF RULE 11*
STEPHEN B. BURBANKt
INTRODUCTION
In selecting a pretentious title for this paper, I had three objec-
tives: (1) to satisfy the convener's need in sending out literature about
the Conference, (2) to settle upon words sufficiently capacious to ac-
commodate anything I write, and (3) to whet both the appetites of
readers of that literature and my own appetite. For you see, I felt like a
character in La Grande Bouffe, a movie in which people literally eat
themselves to death. Having at that point suffered a steady diet of Rule
11 for more than a year as reporter of the Third Circuit Task Force on
Rule 11, I did not want to regurgitate what I had already written; I
was not sure that I would have the stomach for more, but I was quite
sure that another meal would kill me.
Refreshed by the prospect of publication of the Task Force's Re-
port,1 and having no desire either to extend the metaphor or fall victim
to the tyranny of a title, I have a modest agenda today. My goal is to
assess amended Rule 11 against the claims and stated aspirations of
those who gave us the Rules Enabling Act in 1934,2 the Federal Rules
* 0 Copyright 1989 Stephen B. Burbank
- Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B., 1968; J.D., 1973, Harvard
University. This Article is a revised version of the paper delivered by the author at the
Conference.
1 The report has since been published by the American Judicature Society. See
RULE 11 IN TRANSITION: THE REPORT OF THE THIRD CIRCUIT TASK FORCE ON
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11 (1989) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT].
As reporter of the Task Force and principal author of the report, I acknowledge heavy
reliance on the analysis and findings in that document. At the same time, I also ac-
knowledge a heavy debt to the members of the Task Force and numerous other individ-
uals who contributed to the final product. See id. at xi-xii.
2 Act of June 19, 1934, ch. 651, §§ 1 & 2, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (codified as
(1925)
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of Civil Procedure in 1938, and the amended Rule itself in 1983.' In
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1982)). As recently amended by Pub. L. No. 100-702, §
401(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4648-49 (1988), section 2072 provides:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of
practice and procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States
district courts (including proceedings before magistrates thereof) and
courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect
after such rules have taken effect.
The same statute adds a new section 2074, as follows:
(a) The Supreme Court shall transmit to the Congress not later than May
I of the year in which a rule prescribed under section 2072 is to become
effective a copy of the proposed rule. Such rule shall take effect no earlier
than December 1 of the year in which such rule is so transmitted unless
otherwise provided by law. The Supreme Court may fix the extent such
rule shall apply to proceedings then pending, except that the Supreme
Court shall not require the application of such rule to further proceedings
then pending to the extent that, in the opinion of the court in which such
proceedings are pending, the application of such rule in such proceedings
would not be feasible or would work injustice, in which event the former
rule applies.
(b) Any such rule creating, abolishing, or modifying an evidentiary privi-
lege shall have no force or effect unless approved by Act of Congress.
Id. Both provisions were effective December 1, 1988. See id. at § 407.
s As amended in 1983 and 1987, Rule 11 provides:
SIGNING OF PLEADINGS, MOTIONS, AND OTHER
PAPERS; SANCTIONS
Every pleading, motion, and other paper of a party represented by an
attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's
individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not repre-
sented by an attorney shall sign the party's pleading, motion, or other
paper and state the party's address. Except when otherwise specifically
provided by rule or statute, pleadings need not be verified or accompanied
by affidavit. The rule in equity that the averments of an answer under
oath must be overcome by the testimony of two witnesses or of one witness
sustained by corroborating circumstances is abolished. The signature of an
attorney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer that the signer has
read the pleading, motion, or other paper, that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation. If a
pleading, motion, or other paper is not signed, it shall be stricken unless it
is signed promptly after the omission is called to the attention of the
pleader or movant. If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in viola-
tion of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall
impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or both, an
appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of
the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (the 1987 amendments made the Federal Rules gender neutral.
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doing so, I shall bring to bear on the issues an analytical framework
and empirical data that the Task Force developed in the preparation of
its Report. My hope is that normative and empirical perspectives on
this still-recent innovation will inform judgments about the future of
Rule 11." Perhaps the exercise also will inform debates about the fu-
ture of American civil procedure and hence at least excuse, if not jus-
tify, my title.
In measuring Rule 11 against these claims and stated aspirations,
it is important to note at the outset characteristics of the Rule and its
history that may affect conclusions to be drawn for its future and about
any more general conclusions.
First, Rule 11 was amended but six years ago, and the amended
Rule was avowedly an experiment. The Advisory Committee knew lit-
tle about experience under the original Rule,5 knew little about the
perceived problems that stimulated the efforts leading to the two pack-
ages of Rules amendments in 1980 and 1983,6 knew little about the
jurisprudence of sanctions,7 and knew little about the benefits and costs
of sanctions as a case management device.' Some of these gaps re-
They were not intended to have any other effect.)
4 For a discussion of this approach to legal scholarship, see Rubin, The Practice
and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1891-1904 (1988). See
also Burbank, Plus qa Change. . . ?, 21 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 509, 512-13 (1988).
5 "Experience shows that in practice Rule 11 has not been effective in deterring
abuses. See 6 [sic] Wright & Miller, Practice and Procedure: Civil § 1334 (1971)."
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note. The cited work asserts that "there is little
evidence of frequent use of sanctions for the violation of Rule 11." 5 C. WRIGHT & A.
MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1334, at 503 (1969); see also Risin-
ger, Honesty in Pleading and its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1, 34-37 (1976) (between 1938
and 1976, only eleven reported cases resulted in a finding that Rule 11 was violated).
Presumably the authors were relying on published opinions. The Task Force's empiri-
cal work suggests that published opinions are an unreliable basis for judgment. See
infra text accompanying note 164; cf A. MILLER, THE AUGUST 1983 AMENDMENTS
TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE CASE MAN-
AGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 38 (1984) (discovery sanctions often are not
reported).
For reference to the emphasis on sanctions in the 1983 amendments as an "experi-
ment," see id. at 40.
6 See Rosenberg, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Action: Assessing Their
Impact, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2197, 2198-2202 (1989).
7 See Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure: Some Questions About Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 997, 999-1002
(1983).
8 Theme two is then addressed directly to the bench. Every empirical study
that we have (and I shouldn't magnify that, because there aren't many
empirical studies and each one has a flaw here or a mole there or a wart
elsewhere) is loud and clear on one proposition: increased judicial man-
agement . . . in the pretrial process cuts down the time frame from insti-
tution to pretrial determination, or resolution. . ..
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present continuity rather than change in that most important part of
American civil procedure that we call federal court rulemaking. In par-
ticular, whatever ties some of the original rulemakers had to the realist
movement, 9 most (but not all) of their successors have severed the em-
pirical cord.10 Yet, however little time it takes to conceive an experi-
ment, it may take far more time to conduct it and to evaluate the re-
sults.11 In the case of amended Rule 11, there is a serious risk of
prematurity in judgment. Interpretations of, and attitudes towards, the
amended Rule are evolving. Although assessments of experience under
the amended Rule need no longer proceed in an empirical vacuum, the
available data are of limited utility to that end beyond the confines of
the Third Circuit.
12
Second, as is well known but easily forgotten, the 1983 amend-
ment of Rule 11 was but one of a number of amendments, a package,
moreover, that was sent to Congress only three years after another.13
Taken together, the amendments of the Eighties may be thought to
chart new directions in federal civil procedure, rendering an assessment
in terms of claims and stated aspirations in 1938 or 1934, let alone
1926,14 an exercise in nostalgia, if not irrelevancy. In any event, 'that
possibility enhances the importance of being precise about the measur-
... Theme four I like to think of as the mortar holding the first three
bricks together. Simply put, it is sanctions. How do you achieve themes
one [increased lawyer responsibility], two [increased judicial management],
and three [reduced discovery abuse]? One answer chosen by the
rulemakers is to impose sanctions.
A. MILLER, supra note 5, at 10-11.
For one example of the common view that a judge who is an effective case man-
ager rarely if ever needs to resort to sanctions, see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1,
at 65. See also Burbank, The Costs of Complexity (Book Review), 85 MICH. L. REV.
1463, 1478 & n.83 (1987).
' See Schlegel, American Legal Realism and Empirical Social Science: From the
Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 459, 495-98 (1979); Shapiro, Federal Rule 16:
A Look at the Theory and Practice of Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969, 1973
(1989).
"0 See Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 2200-02, 2211; see also Weinstein, After Fifty
Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the Barriers to Justice Being
Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1903 (1989) (little empirical data available).
"_ Cf Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal Rules
and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 717 (1988) ("We are constantly
reminded that 'judicial reform is no sport for the short-winded,' but often the quip
more accurately describes the time it takes to sell a proposed reform than the time
invested in conceiving it." (footnotes omitted)).
12 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 56, 75.
iS See Burbank, supra note 7, at 997-1000. The 1983 amendments included revi-
sions of Rules 6, 7, 11, 16, 26, 52, 53, and 67, and added new Rules 72-76.
14 See Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015,
1083-89 (1982); Burbank, supra note 11, at 713 n.137.
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RULE 11
ing rod one is using. 5
Third, if it is true that "the trend of modern procedural law has
been away from rules that make policy choices towards those that con-
fer on trial courts a substantial amount of normative discretion," 6 Rule
11 must be considered a "notable exception[] '" in its command to im-
pose sanctions upon finding a violation.
I. UNIFORMITY
Proponents of the Enabling Act" and of the original Federal
Rules" sold both on the promise that uniform federal procedure would
be superior to federal procedure under the Conformity Act of 1872,"
which yielded a melange of state and federal law. The arguments ad-
vanced by the sellers as well as the counter-arguments advanced by
opponents need not detain us. Professor Subrin's paper supports the
view that, whoever had the better of the debate then, it would be hard
to call federal procedure uniform today.2' The Federal Rules may ap-
pear uniform, but many of them merely empower district judges to
make ad hoc decisions. They may "largely eschew borrowing [of state
law], but they are nonetheless heavily in debt."22 They are, in sum, the
tip of an iceberg. Below the water line lies "a bewildering array of
local rules, standing orders, and standard operating procedures, to say
nothing of case law."' 3
'5 Judge Weinstein has turned this speculation into an argument, quoting me out
of context. See Weinstein, supra note 10, at 1913. He also attempts to hold a mirror to
my previous observation that he engaged in "wishful thinking," Burbank, The Chan-
cellor's Boot, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 31, 33 (1988), which is puzzling because he
acknowledges our agreement "that access should not be denied." Weinstein, supra note
10, at 1913.
10 Burbank, supra note 11, at 715.
a Id.; see also Burbank, supra note 7, at 1008-10.
IS First, to make uniform throughout the United States the forms of pro-
cess, writs, pleadings, and motions and the practice and procedure in the
district courts in actions at law. It is believed that if this were its only
advantage that [sic] lawyers and litigants would find, in uniformity alone,
a tremendous advance over the present system.
S. REP. No. 1174, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1926) [hereinafter 1926 SENATE
REPORT].
11 See, e.g., Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States:
Hearings Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1938)
[hereinafter Hearings] (testimony of Attorney General Cummings).
20 Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 255, §§ 5 & 6, 17 Stat. 196, 197.
21 See Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Diver-
gence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2018-21 (1989);
Coquillette, Squiers & Subrin, The Role of Local Rules, 75 A.B.A. J. 62 (1989).
Burbank, supra note 11, at 715.
22 Id. But see Weinstein, supra note 10, at 1902, 1911-12. It is hard to take
seriously claims of uniformity (or attempts to downplay a lack of uniformity) by a
19891 1929
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But surely Rule 11 is different. After all, rather than conferring
normative discretion on district judges, the Rule purports at one critical
point to take it away. Moreover, although local rules and standing or-
ders elaborating its requirements are not unknown, they have not been
a growth industry.24
Alas, Rule 11 is not different. Even after a six-year period that
has witnessed some sharp turns by courts25 and commentators26 alike
(which have brought more of them together), there is a conflict between
or among circuits on practically every important question of interpreta-
tion and policy under the Rule, from the content of the duties imposed
on a person who signs a paper filed in district court, 27 to the procedural
rights of those who may be sanctioned, 8 the persons or entities on
whom sanctions may be imposed,29 the standard(s) of appellate re-
view,3" and even to whether sanctions are in fact mandatory for a viola-
federal judge who proclaims that in his courtroom "the federal rules are of little signifi-
cance in day-to-day practice." Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth An-
niversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1,
28 (1988). Moreover, Judge Weinstein's discussion, for example, of experience under
Rule 11, Rule 23, and Rule 56, and of special pleading requirements, see Weinstein,
supra note 10, at 1913-16 hardly suggests uniformity. Is this the "experimentation"
Judge Weinstein favors, see id. at 1911, or the "procedural subterfuge" he decries? Id.
at 1919. What other than "personal politics and wishful thinking," see supra note 15,
determines the label? "If judges are given broad discretion, and district courts may vary
widely in the local rules and standing orders they adopt, one should not expect any
significant degree of uniformity from judge to judge, court to court, or case to case."
Shapiro, supra note 9, at 1993-94.
2 See Letter from Mary P. Squiers, Esq., to Stephen B. Burbank (Jan. 11, 1989)
(reporting findings of Judicial Conference's Local Rules Project) (copy available from
author).
25 Compare Robinson v. National Cash Register Co., 808 F.2d 1119, 1125-32
(5th Cir. 1987) (Rule 11 imposes a continuing obligation and appellate review is under
tripartite standard) with Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866 (5th Cir.
1988) (en banc) (no continuing obligation under Rule 11 and unitary standard of re-
view applies).
2 Compare Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 - a Closer
Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985) (bullish) with Schwarzer, Rule 11 Revisited, 101 HARV.
L. REV. 1013 (1988) (bearish).
2 Compare Herron v. Jupiter Transp. Co., 858 F.2d 332, 335-36 (6th Cir. 1988)
(Rule 11 imposes a continuing obligation) with Thomas, 836 F.2d at 874-75 (no con-
tinuing obligation under Rule 11).
2 Compare United States v. Childers, 846 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1988) (text in
WESTLAW and LEXIS) (Rule 11 sanction imposed without prior opportunity to be
heard affirmed) with Sanko S.S. Co. v. Galin, 835 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1987) (similarly
imposed sanction reversed).
29 Compare Calloway v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 854 F.2d 1452, 1478-81
(2d Cir. 1988) (Rule 11 sanction may be imposed on a law firm), cert. granted sub.
nom. Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, 109 S. Ct. 1116 (1989) with
Robinson, 808 F.2d at 1128-29 (non-signing partner may not be sanctioned under
Rule 11).
'0 See Kale v. Combined Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 746, 756-58 (1st Cir. 1988); TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 45-46.
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tion.3" Moreover, intracircuit conflicts are not uncommon,32 and in a
number of circuits there is no appellate law at all on numerous impor-
tant questions of interpretation.
There is, of course, an easy (to state, not to implement) answer to
intracircuit disuniformity; indeed, in the last year or so, a number of en
banc opinions have sought to put Rule 11 questions to bed, even those
not ready for it.33 Similarly, in some circuits where appellate law on
Rule 11 is not well developed, panels have sought to fill the void, per-
haps on the theory that dictum, especially if it is repeated, is better
than silence.34
As for intercircuit conflicts, the Supreme Court is available, and
its failure to take a Rule 11 case to date may suggest that it is waiting
for the issues to "percolate" 3 5-an unfortunately apt metaphor for is-
sues that bring so many lawyers' blood to the boiling point.
Is it, then, unfair to tax the amended Rule with failing the test of
uniformity? Perhaps. Perhaps also that is no longer a useful test in
light of the movement toward individual case management, a movement
best reflected in other amendments that became effective in 1983, nota-
bly to Rule 16.3" Looking at the question from both perspectives may
help to formulate goals for the Federal Rules of the future.
It is possible that, after an additional period that includes a few
authoritative pronouncements by the Supreme Court, Rule 11 will be
not only formally uniform in its application in all federal trial courts,
but will yield, within acceptable limits that account for differences
among cases, uniform results. Uniformity of result was, as Professor
31 Compare Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986) (no sanc-
tions necessary for de minimis violations), cert. denied sub nom. County of Suffolk v.
Graseck, 480 U.S. 918 (1987) with.Thomas, 836 F.2d at 876 (stating that there are
"no longer any 'free passes' for attorneys and litigants who violate Rule 11").
32 See, e.g., FDIC v. Tekfen Constr. & Installation Co., 847 F.2d 440, 443 (7th
Cir. 1988) (standard of appellate review). I speak here of conflicts in the rule or stan-
dard only, not in the ways in which a supposedly uniform rule or standard is applied.
See infra text accompanying notes 38-48.
33 See, e.g., Thomas, 836 F.2d 866; Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir.
1987) (en banc).
31 See, e.g., Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482-85 (3d Cir. 1987).
35 See, e.g., United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984) (noting that
"[a]llowing only one final adjudication would deprive this Court of the benefit it re-
ceives from permitting several courts of appeals to explore a difficult question"); S.
ESTREICHER & J. SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT'S ROLE: A THEORY
OF MANAGING THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL PROcEss 48-52, 73-74 (1986). After this pa-
per was delivered, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel
Entertainment Group, 109 S. Ct. 1116 (1989). The grant, however, is restricted to a
narrow issue, suggesting that guidance on other more fundamental questions will come
by way of dictum or await future cases.
38 See A. MILLER, supra note 5, at 10, 19-30; Subrin, supra note 21, at 2022-23.
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Subrin explains in his paper, an ultimate goal of proponents of the
Enabling Act.3" Moreover, it must be a goal, however difficult to attain,
of a system that aspires to equal justice-procedural and substantive. In
the case of Rule 11, it is a goal that may be impossible to attain.
Behind some of the conflicts, inter- and intra-circuit, to which I
have referred lie differences deeper than disagreement on this or that
point of doctrine. Those differences extend to the purposes of amended
Rule 11,38 and they reflect differences about the values that procedural
rules serve or should serve. As an example, some judges are using Rule
11 to shift the expenses they deem "unjustified," caused by papers they
deem "frivolous," to the lawyer or litigant they deem responsible for
the filing of the paper. 9 The results may include (1) an incursion into
the American Rule on attorney's fees as deep as the notion of frivolity
is subjective, 40 (2) a view of sanctioning procedure that at times seems
to impute greater rights to one who makes a Rule 11 motion than to
one against whom such a motion is made,41 (3) a narrowing of the
normative discretion that the Rule unquestionably confers on trial
judges to select an appropriate sanction,42 and (4) a narrowing of the
allocative discretion that an appellate court truly concerned about the
costs of satellite litigation happily would leave with trial judges.43 This
is by no means a complete list of the possible results of giving primacy
to legal products and to a compensatory goal in the interpretation and
implementation of amended Rule 11. It may, however, suffice to sug-
gest that equal justice will be possible under Rule 11 only when federal
judges subordinate their own normative preferences to the stated nor-
" See Subrin, supra note 21, at 2002-06 see also Burbank, supra note 14, at
1049.
" See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 9-52.
3' See, e.g., Hays v. Sony Corp., 847 F.2d 412, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1988); S.A. Auto
Lube, Inc. v. Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc., 842 F.2d 946, 948-49 (7th Cir. 1988); Szabo Food
Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1077 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. dismissed, 108
S. Ct. 1101 (1988); Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 802
F.2d 247, 254 (7th Cir. 1986); In re TCI, Ltd., 769 F.2d 441, 445 (7th Cir. 1985)
(dictum).
40 See Hays, 847 F.2d at 419 ("Rule 11 is a fee-shifting statute"). But see TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 10-12, 18-19.
41 See Szabo Food Serv., 823 F.2d at 1082-84; Tarkowski v. County of Lake, 775
F.2d 173, 176 (7th Cir. 1985) (Rule 11 and § 1988). But see TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 35-36, 74.
42 See S.A. Auto Lube, 842 F.2d at 950-51; Eastway Constr. Co. v. New York,
762 F.2d 243, 254 n.7 (2d Cir. 1985). But see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at
48. For a discussion of normative and allocative discretion, see Shapiro, Jurisdiction
and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 543, 545-47 (1985).
"' See Brown v. Federation of State Med. Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1434 & n.3 (7th




mative preferences of the Rule and of the rulemakers.
If Rule 11 is to be more than superficially uniform, it will not be
sufficient to recognize that deterrence of abuse is its most important
goal." That would leave lower courts, and even judges on the same
court, free to pursue a subsidiary goal of compensation, and some of
them would do so routinely and relentlessly.45 Rather, courts should
regard compensation not as end (goal) in itself, but as one among many
means available, through the choice of an appropriate sanction, to ad-
vance the goal of deterrence. In doing so, they would be faithful to the
language of the Rule and to its Advisory Committee Note."6
Equally important, s6 long as the abuses at which Rule 11 is di-
rected are defined to include papers deemed legally frivolous, the detec-
tion of violations will be as determinate, and hence as uniform, as the
notion of frivolousness itself."7 Courts should cease reading Rule 11 in
the teeth of its language and thus cease reading it to reach legal prod-
ucts in addition to the conduct responsible for those products. Of course
product may in an appropriate case ground an inference about conduct.
Talk about inferences is a smoke-screen, however, unless a judge is
prepared to consider conduct and would find no violation when
presented with persuasive evidence of reasonable pre-filing inquiry and
" See, e.g., Thomas v. Capital Sec. Serv., Inc., 836 F.2d 866, 876 (5th Cir. 1988)
(en banc); Brown, 830 F.2d at 1438.
"I See S.A. Auto Lube, 842 F.2d at 950; cf. Note, A Uniform Approach to Rule
11 Sanctions, 97 YALE L.J. 901, 905-07 (1988) (discussing differing judicial percep-
tions of the purpose of Rule 11).
4 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note ("The word 'sanctions' in the
caption . . . stresses a deterrent orientation .... "). The Third Circuit Task Force
recommends:
(2) Deterrence of abuse by the person sanctioned (specific deterrence)
should be regarded as Rule I's most important goal, and courts should
pursue other goals only to the extent necessary or appropriate to attain-
ment of specific deterrence. Compensation should be regarded as one
(among many) means to the end of deterrence, not as an end in itself.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 96.
'7 The Third Circuit Task Force recommends:
(3) The abuses for which Rule 11 sanctions are imposed should be both
deterrable and remediable. They should comprise the conduct specified in
the Rule itself and the Advisory Committee Note, as elaborated in case
law. They should not include the "abuse" of a frivolous product, which is
not there specified, which may be neither deterrable nor remediable, and
the subjectivity of judgment about which, particularly as to matters of law,
threatens to overwhelm the Advisory Committee's cautions about "using
the wisdom of hindsight" and "chill[ing] an attorney's enthusiasm or crea-
tivity in pursuing factual or legal theories." On the other hand, in assess-
ing conduct and representations about conduct, a court should in appropri-
ate cases draw inferences from product.
Id. at 96-97; see also infra text accompanying notes 90-92, 96-97; infra note 124.
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of an honest conclusion based on such inquiry that the paper in ques-
tion was "well grounded in fact and . . warranted by existing law or
a good faith argument for the extension, modification or reversal of ex-
isting law." '48
These steps would go a long way toward achieving greater uni-
formity in determinations that Rule 11 has or has not been violated.
They would not, however, promote uniformity in the sanctions im-
posed; indeed, quite the reverse. Would not routine expense-shifting be
better from that perspective?
For present purposes the problem would be, again, that the Rule
would be only superficially uniform. Rule 11 sanctions are intended to
affect conduct, both that of the violator (specific deterrence) and that of
others (general deterrence). They are intended to chill certain conduct
but not other conduct. Sanctions, monetary or non-monetary, can affect
people in different ways. In this case, the Advisory Committee had
been alerted to the risks of differential impact, and it sought to mini-
mize at least some of them. 9 Routine resort to expense-shifting under
Rule 11, particularly expense-shifting on an attorney's fee model, is
inconsistent with the trial court's duty to exercise discretion in selecting
a sanction appropriate to the goal of specific deterrence and its duty to
avoid over-deterrence, specific or general. 50
Professor Carrington would have us believe that, in using the
phrase "general rules" in the Rules Enabling Act of 1934,51 Congress
intended not only that the same Federal Rules be applicable in all fed-
eral district courts, but that the same Rules be applicable in all types of
cases, that, in other words, the Rules be not only uniform but also
48 FED. R. CIv. P. 11; see also TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 20, 23.
"Pre-signing inquiry" would be more precise, but "pre-filing inquiry" has become
standard usage.
' The rule is not intended to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity in
pursuing factual or legal theories. The court is expected to avoid using the
wisdom of hindsight and should test the signer's conduct by inquiring
what was reasonable to believe at the time the pleading, motion, or other
paper was submitted. ...
. Although the standard is the same for unrepresented parties . . . the
court has sufficient discretion to take account of the special circumstances
that often arise in pro se situations. ...
T .. he word "sanctions" in the caption . . . stresses a deterrent orienta-
tion in dealing with improper . . . papers. . . .The court, however, re-
tains the necessary flexibility to deal appropriately with violations of the
rule. It has discretion to tailor sanctions to the particular facts of the case.
FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note.
50 See infra text accompanying notes 97-100.
5 This language has survived the recent amendments. See supra note 2.
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trans-substantive. 52 I know of no support for that proposition in the
legislative history of the 1934 Act5 3 or in its "antecedent period of trav-
ail."'54 Moreover, I encourage those with even the most fleeting interest
in politics to consider the rest of Professor Carrington's defense of
trans-substantive rules.5 5 The notion appears to be that judges can be
relied upon to bridge the gap between formal equality and inequality in
fact, or that in any event the costs of acknowledging the differential
impact of Federal Rules that are only trivially uniform and trans-sub-
stantive outweigh the benefits.
Professor Carrington is alert to the costs of departing from the
appearance of "political neutrality" 56 but deaf to the costs of what
Judge Weinstein calls "procedural subterfuge. ' 57 Indeed, at times he
52 See Carrington, Continuing Work on the Civil Rules: The Summons, 63 No-
TRE DAME L. REV. 733, 741 (1988). Dialogue at the Conference appears to have
caused some retreat from this position. See Carrington, Making Rules to Dispose of
Manifestly Unfounded Assertions: An Exorcism of the Bogy of Non-Trans-Substantive
Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2067, 2079 (1989) [hereinafter Car-
rington, Bogy]. But, we are now told, "generalism in procedure rules for Article III
courts may have constitutional roots in the fifth amendment." Id. at 2081.
" For a discussion and analysis of "general rules" as used in the Enabling Act,
see letter from Stephen B. Burbank to Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
(Feb. 27, 1984), reprinted in Hearing on H.R. 2633 and H.R. 3550 Before the Sub-
comm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the House Comm. on
the Judiciary, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 24-31 (1985).
Although an intent to require trans-substantive procedure is not fairly imputed to
Congress, that characteristic probably was assumed by the original rulemakers. See
Burbank, supra note 11, at 714 n.140; Subrin, supra note 21, at 2006.
" Jaffin, Federal Procedural Revision, 21 VA. L. REV. 504, 504 (1935).
15 See Carrington, Bogy, supra note 52, at 2067-87.
56 Id. at 2074-79.
5 Weinstein, supra note 10, at 1919. Professor Hazard, on the other hand,
clearly recognizes the phenomenon. Indeed, one of his arguments seems to be that criti-
cisms of trans-substantive procedure are naive or misdirected from the perspective of
practical politics because "[tihe dynamic of social justice litigation has been the use of
existing general forms of procedure for new substantive purposes." Hazard, Discovery
Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 137 U.
PA. L. REV. 2237, 2247 (1989). This is hardly an answer to those, like myself, who are
not concerned about a specific social agenda (except to the extent that concern about
democracy and rights can be characterized as such). See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 8,
at 1473-76; Subrin, supra note 21, at 2050-51. Moreover, those who have such an
agenda also may find revealing Professor Hazard's invocation of the "Due Process
principle" in connection with his assertion that "[tirans-substantivity of procedure is a
principle to which commitment is shared by persons of such different substantive orien-
tations as, for example, Judge Posner and Judge Carter." Hazard, supra, at 2247.
Social reformers know all about "commitment." They know, for instance, that some-
thing is lost in the translation of some "commitments" into action. Consider in that
regard Judge Posner's views on due process in imposing sanctions under Federal Rule
of Appellate Procedure 38:
But obviously the right to a hearing, whether that right is implicit or.
explicit, is limited to cases where a hearing would assist the court in its
decision. . . . Where, as in this and most Rule 38 cases, the conduct that
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appears to swallow his own propaganda, as when he portrays as a cen-
tral feature of our legal system, upon which Congress "relies,""" the
class action amendments in 1966," 9 yet fails to acknowledge that the
impact of those amendments on power relations was anticipated, if not
intended, by his predecessor, Judge Kaplan. 0
In effect, Professor Carrington identifies as "political" only that
which is recognized as of interest by some coherent (and, apparently,
wholly self-interested) group."1 According to this view, "neutrality"
means "reduc[ing] the level of political interest in procedural rules." '62
And according to this view, both substance-specific procedures and em-
pirical investigation of supposedly neutral rules are anathema: the for-
mer because they will be likely to attract rather than "deflect political
attention"6" and the latter because data on experience under the Rules
may cause organized groups to realize that they have a stake and hence
to regard the "neutral" rule as a legitimate object of political interest.
From this perspective, amended Rule 11 and some of the other
1983 amendments 4 do mark a new direction, signalling a more candid
recognition that different cases may have different requirements. The
question, of course, is whether and when the only or the best answer to
is sought to be sanctioned consists of making objectively groundless legal
arguments in briefs filed in this court, there are no issues that a hearing
could illuminate. All the relevant "conduct" is laid out in the briefs them-
selves; neither the mental state of the attorney nor any other factual issue
is pertinent to the imposition of sanctions for such conduct. Where a hear-
ing would be pointless it is not required.
Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 814 F.2d 1192, 1201-02 (7th Cir. 1987).
Professor Hazard's other argument is that, viewing the entire landscape of proce-
dure, the Federal Rules are really not that important. See Hazard, supra, at 2244-46.
This is a variation on a familiar rhetorical theme, interesting only because of its persis-
tence and because, in playing the variations, Professor Hazard does not practice what
he preaches: political realism. See Burbank, Afterwords: A Response to Professor Haz-
ard antd a Comment on Marrese, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 659, 661-62 (1985); see also
infra note 81.
See Carrington, Bogy, supra note 52, at 2071.
5 See id.; Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
See Kaplan, Comment on Carrington, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2125, 2126-27
(1989).
"' Not even the Supreme Court shares this impoverished view. Recently, the
Court adduced Rule 23 in support of the proposition that "this Court's rulemaking
under the enabling acts has been substantive and political in the sense that the rules of
procedure have important effects on the substantive rights of litigants." Mistretta v.
United States, 109 S. Ct. 647, 665 (1989) (footnote omitted); see also id. at 665 n.19.
8' Carrington, Bogy, supra note 52, at 2085; see also Leubsdorf, Constitutional
Civil Procedure, 63 TEx. L. REV. 579, 614 (1984) ("Those who suffer from a bad
procedural rule usually do not know in advance that they will be its victims, or even
that the rule exists, and are usually scattered and disorganized.").
Carrington, Bogy, supra note 52 at 2079.
64 See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 16, 26(b)(1).
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that perception lies in reliance on the discretion of judges, guided by
general directions that usually are not informed by empirical study, to
deliver on the promise of equal justice. Even the experience under Rule
11 in a circuit whose judges, by and large, have not amended the Rule
in pursuit of their normative preferences furnishes reasons to be con-
cerned about discretionary justice.
We know that for a one-year period in the Third Circuit, Rule 11
had a disproportionately adverse impact on plaintiffs, in that plaintiffs
or their counsel were the targets of two-thirds of the motions made
during that period and were sanctioned at a higher rate (15.9%) than
defendants (9.1%). Plaintiffs or their counsel also were the object of six
of the eight sanctions imposed by courts on their own motion. Consider-
ing sanctions imposed on motion and sua sponte, plaintiffs accounted
for 77.8% (21 of 27) of the sanctions in the Task Force's survey.65
What should we do with such information?
One possibility is to consider an amendment to Rule 12(a), which,
by providing only twenty days to answer a complaint, 6 constitutes "an
institutional invitation to defendants not to take seriously the duty of
reasonable pre-filing inquiry." 7 Empirical study might find that exten-
sions are routine, but an amendment expanding the basic period (and
limiting extensions) nonetheless might help to alter what appears to be
a widespread misimpression that Rule 11 is intended (if not exclu-
sively, then primarily) for plaintiffs.6" Another possibility, through an
amendment or case law, is to discourage routine resort to expense-shift-
ing as a sanction, on the hypothesis, supported by empirical evidence,
that "[tlhe paper of choice in the fee-shifting game is the complaint"
and that "[p]laintiffs. . . lack a comparable pot of gold . . . because in
most cases . . . the answer is not a likely candidate for Rule 11 sanc-
tions."6 9 Still another possibility is to consider the impact of litigation
finance on incentives under Rule 11, starting with the hypothesis, again
supported by empirical evidence, that the contingent fee is confined
largely to the representation of plaintiffs and speculating, I hope not
unreasonably, that lawyers are more likely to spend their clients'
61 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 65. The findings that plaintiffs
were the targets of 67% of Rule 11 motions and that they accounted for 77.8% of the
total sanctions are statistically significant at a level of less than one percent. The find-
ing that plaintiffs are sanctioned at a higher rate on motion is not statistically
significant.
66 "A defendant shall serve an answer within 20 days after the service of the
summons and complaint upon that defendant. . . ." FED. R. Civ. P. 12(a).
6" TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 68; see also Joseph v. United States,
121 F.R.D. 406, 410 (D. Haw. 1988).
68 See TASK FORcE REPORT, supra note 1, at 66-67.
69 Id. at 67.
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money on Rule 11 motions than they are to spend their own."
We also know that for the same one-year period in the Third Cir-
cuit, Rule 11 had a disproportionately adverse impact on civil rights
plaintiffs, in that civil rights plaintiffs, their lawyers, or both were
sanctioned at a rate (47.1%) far higher than the rate for plaintiffs as a
whole (15.9%), and higher still than the rate for plaintiffs in non-civil
rights cases (8.45%)." Again, what should we do with such informa-
tion? Should we consider that, quite apart from Rule 11, some federal
courts have imposed pleading requirements on civil rights plaintiffs 2
that are more stringent than Rule 8" would seem to authorize? Should
we be more precise about what we mean by a "civil rights case" and, if
we find that § 1983 actions constitute a disproportionately large slice of
the Rule 11 pie, consider whether they have characteristics that render
this or that approach to the interpretation of Rule 11 or to the selection
of a sanction more appropriate than some other?74 Should we sepa-
rately consider uncounselled pro se cases or prisoner cases?75
I do not know where such inquiries would lead us, although I do
know that eliminating uncounselled pro se plaintiffs from the Task
Force's data would not alter the conclusion of disproportionate impact
in civil rights cases. The sanction rate for counselled plaintiffs in civil
rights cases (45.5%) is still far higher than the rate for counselled
plaintiffs in non-civil rights cases (8.7%) as well as for counselled
plaintiffs as a whole (13.75%).7 In any event, I find it hard to believe
70 See id. For other reasons to expect continuing disproportionate impact on plain-
tiffs, see id. at 67-68.
71 See id. at 69. The finding as to civil rights plaintiffs and plaintiffs in non-civil
rights cases is statistically significant at a level of less than one percent.
72 See, e.g., Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 838 F.2d 663, 666 (3d Cir.
1988) (requiring that section 1983 claims "contain a modicum of factual specificity").
See generally Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 433, 449-50 (1986).
71 RULE 8. GENERAL RULES OF PLEADING.
(a) CLAIMS FOR RELIEF. A pleading which sets forth a claim for
relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party
claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds upon
which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already has juris-
diction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it,
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief, and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief the pleader
seeks. Relief in the alternative or of several different types may be
demanded.
FED. R. Clv. P. 8(a).
7' See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 69-72, 100.
70 See generally Note, Preserving Pro Se Representation in an Age of Rule 11
Sanctions, 65 TEX. L. REV. 351 (1988).
7 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 71. The finding as to counselled
civil rights plaintiffs and counselled plaintiffs in non-civil rights cases is statistically
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that inquiries such as these would leave us satisfied with the status quo.
To quote again from Professor Atiyah's inaugural lecture at Oxford:
I have said that perhaps one reason for the trend I have de-
scribed is that it is easier to conceal a diversity of values
when principles are jettisoned in favor of individualized jus-
tice. But how long can this process of concealment last? At a
time when the ideal of egalitarianism rides as high as it does
today, it is supremely ironical that we should at the same
time be embracing discretion and rejecting principles; for this
process must of necessity encourage and legitimize a greater
inequality of treatment in the judicial process. The diversity
of values underlying judicial decisions is thus concealed only
by encouraging a departure from the ideal of equality."
Most legal scholars experience tension between the advocacy they
teach and the pursuit of knowledge to which they aspire.7 For legal
scholars involved in the practical business of lawmaking, that tension
must be acute. Even if empirical work offers the best help in mediating
the tension felt by the scholar,7 9 the scholar/lawmaker usually does not
have time. 0 Still, I would argue, she should have the interest, and in-
terest is not conveyed best by apologies for the status quo. If, as I have
advocated, "[wie need partnerships in determining how the field should
be carved up for study, in studying it, and in implementing proposed
reforms,"'" they will not be forged from challenges by those with access
to resources that could spell the difference.8 2 It should not be necessary,
significant at a level of less than one percent.
" Atiyah, From Principles to Pragmatism: Changes in the Function of the Judi-
cial Process and the Law, 65 IOWA L. REv. 1249, 1271 (1980).
78 See Kronman, Foreword: Legal Scholarship and Moral Education, 90 YALE
L.J. 955, 956 (1981).
11 See Burbank, supra note 4, at 512; Rubin, supra note 4, at 1895-98.
80 Cf. Weinstein, supra note 10, at 1903. I do not speak of mere professors. Their
problem is not lack of "time to visit the courts and law firms to see what really is
occurring." Id. It is, rather, lack of training and inclination. See Burbank, supra note
4, at 512-13; Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 2201-02, 2211.
8' Burbank, supra note 11, at 718. Both in his paper, see Carrington, Bogy, supra
note 52, at 2076, and in colloquy at the Conference, Professor Carrington invoked the
lack of qualifications of the present rulemakers, "a committee of technicians[,]. . . to
consider the relative merits of competing political interests." Id. That is my point, but it
simply means that we need to expand membership in the club, just as we need to
expand its activities beyond the library. See Rosenberg, supra note 6, at 2201, 2211.
82 For examples of such challenges, see Carrington, Bogy, supra note 52, at 2069;
Hazard, supra note 57, at 2238.
Professor Carrington voices the suspicion that the group of "major problems of
civil procedure that would yield more readily to multiple solutions" is "an empty set."
Carrington, Bogy, supra note 52, at 2086. Yet, he acknowledges the propriety of
"building into substantive enactments specific procedural provisions" when "necessary
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I respectfully suggest, for those who distrust the "concealment" of al-
legedly uniform and trans-substantive Federal Rules to show those
with the power to affect legal development anything. We all should be
looking for a better way and employing more than the power of ratioci-
nation undisciplined by facts in the search. We need fewer mind exper-
iments'and more field experiments, procedural rules as well as proce-
dural theories that are "based on experience." 3 No one I know is
suggesting a return to the forms of action or a wholesale rejection of
trans-substantive procedure.8 4 Some of us, however, are suggesting that
it is time both to face facts, in particular the fact that uniformity and
trans-substantivity rhetoric are a sham,8 5 and to find out the facts, in
particular the facts about discretionary justice. A "veil of ignorance"8"
may be an apt metaphor to describe federal rulemaking to date.17 It is
to effect enforcement of a substantive right." Id. (footnote omitted). Moreover, he sug-
gests that "[p]erhaps adjustment should [be] made as well for cases subject to a fee-
shifting statute." Id. at 2114-15 (footnote omitted). If such heresy is possible from one
who espouses a "veil of ignorance" norm for rulemakers, id. at 2079, think of the
possibilities if we troubled to find out how the Federal Rules really work. Until that
time, however, challenges to identify where departures from trans-substantivity should
occur are invitations to accept norms both of ignorance and of arrogance.
Carrington, Bogy, supra note 52, at 2082.
84 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 11, at 717 & n.172; Subrin, supra note 22, at
2048-49. Of course, it suits the rhetorical purposes of defenders of the status quo to
pretend otherwise. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 57, at 2244; see also supra note 82.
5 Professor Carrington invokes a "principle of generalism," which he imputes to
the Enabling Act, as the reason why the rulemakers have declined "to devise special
pleading rules in cases arising under the civil liability provisions of the RICO Act."
Carrington, Bogy, supra note 52, at 2080 (footnote omitted). This confuses the Ena-
bling Act's requirement of uniform ("general") rules with a requirement, not fairly
imputable to the Act, that Federal Rules also be trans-substantive. See supra text ac-
companying notes 51-55. More important, it neglects the fact that somt courts already
are imposing such "special pleading rules." See Burbank, supra note 11, at 716.
8 Carrington, Bogy, supra note 52, at 2079; see also supra note 82.
87 See supra text accompanying notes 9-10. Benjamin Kaplan certainly did not
share Professor Carrington's view concerning the appropriate posture of rulemakers or,
for that matter, concerning the inviolability of the "principle of generalism." In 1967,
as Reporter of the Advisory Committee, Kaplan wrote to Dean Acheson, the commit-
tee's chair, proposing a program of "basic research, both theoretic and empiric, with
three interlocking phases or aspects ... " Letter from Benjamin Kaplan to Dean Ach-
eson, Esq. 3 (Mar. 2, 1967).
(b) The second phase would be an attempt to classify the various
types of court-litigated matters by their intrinsic qualities and functions
with a view to deciding whether the unitary court procedures now in
vogue could be deliberately altered to accommodate better to the several
types. The general advantages of a unitary or common procedure are evi-
dent, but they may be overborne by other considerations in certain classes
of cases. As in (a) above, a study of this kind, while centering on proce-
dure, could not remain totally procedural. The various classes of cases
could be understood only if their substantive settings were appreciated,
and this means an analysis of the relevant social and economic facts as
well as the controlling material rules of law.
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not, I contend, an appropriate normative posture for the rulemakers of
the future.
II. SIMPLICITY AND PREDICTABILITY
Just as federal procedure is no longer, if it ever was, uniform, it is
for the same reasons no longer, if it ever was, simple and predictable. 8
A lawyer charting a procedural course can rely as safely on the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure as a sailor in the Bermuda Triangle can rely
on a world atlas.89 Touted as a pocket bible,90 the Federal Rules now
are best suited for an agnostic. Rule 11 is no exception.
As currently interpreted and implemented in many circuits, Rule
11 fails the historic tests of simplicity and predictability. "[L]ittle is less
focused . . . precise [or predictable than] what a judge or group of
judges will think about a legal paper,""1 and in particular whether they
will deem that paper legally frivolous. The costs of unpredictabil-
ity-which in this case arguably results from judicial amend-
ment 92-can include over-deterrence, which is the sort of chilling that
concerned critics of the amended Rule at the time it was proposed and
that also concerned the Advisory Committee. 3 Moreover, probably be-
cause of preoccupation with a compensation perspective, or at least
with expense-shifting as a sanction, Rule 11 jurisprudence is becoming
complex. In some circuits, those seeking sanctions have been invested
It would be well to attempt to sort out litigated cases on a variety of
bases besides the functional. For example, we have never pursued the full
implications of a decision that small cases should not be able to claim the
same refinements of procedure as big cases.
Id.
This letter is an important document in the history of modern American civil pro-
cedure, no less so because Kaplan's suggestion was not acted on. Accordingly, it is
reproduced in full as an Appendix to this Article.
88 The 1926 Senate Report observed: "Second, these general rules, if wisely made,
would be a long step toward simplicity, a most desirable step in view of the chaotic and
complicated condition which now exists." 1926 SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 2;
see also Burbank, supra note 11, at 713, 715-16.
89 "If a group of mariners tired of studying their complicated charts should decide
to throw them away and adopt more simple maps, they would not thereby do away
with the air and water currents through which they must pass, or the icebergs or the
reefs in their course." Hall, Uniform Law Procedure in Federal Courts, 33 W. VA.
L.Q. 131, 134 (1927); see also Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 909,
995 (1987); Subrin, supra note 21, at 1999, 2010.
90 See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 19, at 4-5 (testimony of Attorney General Cum-
mings); Subrin, supra note 21, at 2018.
' TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 21.
92 See id. at 15.
9 See supra note 49 and accoriipanying text.
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with duties, such as a formal duty of mitigation,94 as well as rights,9 5
and courts are turning to the jurisprudence of attorney's fees for guid-
ance in imposing sanctions.9 6
Again, confining the abuses covered by Rule 11's "frivolousness
clause" to pre-filing conduct should go a long way to solve the problem
of unpredictability, as it should to advance the Rule's primary goal of
deterrence.
Assume that a court finds that a lawyer did this much fac-
tual investigation or read these cases and that he/she should
have pursued other factual leads or shepardized the cases
consulted. The lawyer and others aware of the sanctioning
decision have a basis for conforming their conduct to the pre-
scribed standards in the future (assuming they have the re-
sources to do so). An opinion imposing Rule 11 sanctions for
failure to perform adequate factual investigation or legal re-
search is thus, in our view, more likely to affect- behavior
than one which sanctions a "wacky" theory. . . A corpus of
such opinions is also more likely to yield consistent directions
than a corpus of opinions finding, or finding other words for,
frivolousness."
On the other hand, taking seriously the duty to exercise discretion
in selecting a sanction appropriate to the goal of deterrence, as opposed,
for instance, to routine expense-shifting on an attorney's fee model, will
not be a simple exercise for judges, which may help to explain why so
many of them have shirked that duty. The difficulty has not to do with
doctrine but with the agony of judgments about human conduct and
what is likely to affect conduct, both of the individuals before the court
and of others. But, again, that is a duty that the Rule imposes and,
more important for present purposes, a reason it does so is evidently
awareness of the differential impact of sanctions, whether viewed from
the perspective of specific or general deterrence.9" From those perspec-
tives, predictability is critical, and it cannot be achieved through rou-
tine, let alone uniform, resort to expense-shifting as a sanction under
" See, e.g., Dubisky v. Owens, 849 F.2d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 1988).
" See supra text accompanying note 41.
" See, e.g., Napier v. Thirty or More Unidentified Fed. Agents, Employees, or
Officers, 855 F.2d 1080, 1089-94 (3d Cir. 1988). But see Levin & Sobel, Achieving
Balance in the Developing Law of Sanctions, 36 OATH. U.L. REv. 587, 598 (1987).
9 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 20-21 (citations omitted).




Faith in general deterrence must assume an actor who
calculates the benefits and costs of behavior in advance. A
monetary sanction onerous for its object may be mad money
for our hypothetical actor. Unless he or she understands that
the sanction was tailored to the circumstances of the violation
and the sanctioned individual, it may be no deterrent at all,
indeed quite the reverse. Worse, a monetary sanction easily
absorbed by its object may be the life savings of our hypo-
thetical actor. Unless he or she understands that sanction to
be a considered response to the circumstances (and not, for
instance, routine expense-shifting), the message received may
be that litigation in federal court is not worth the risk.99
Thus, just as uniformity is a mirage in the implementation of Rule
11, so is simplicity. Moreover and ironically, both mirages have been
purchased at the price of predictability. The irony arises from the fact
that the 1983 arriendments to the Federal Rules to a considerable extent
gave up on the goals of uniformity and simplicity as any longer worth
pursuing (except formally)., 00 As an instrument of deterrence, amended
Rule 11 cannot be thought to have given up on predictability. Judges
have done that.
III. ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS
The proponents of the Enabling Act 01 and the drafters of the
Federal Rules 02 shared the goal that procedure be the servant rather
than the master of the substantive law. In implementation of that goal,
the latter gave us a system in which pleading was to play a relatively
minor, and not often dispositive, role in the definition or resolution of
disputes brought to federal court. They expected party-initiated discov-
ery to develop and refine disputes and the judicial discovery of pre-trial,
99 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 43-44.
100 See supra text accompanying note 64.
101 Fourth, it would make it more certain that if a plaintiff has a cause of
action he would not be turned out of court upon a technicality and without
a trial upon the very merits of the case; and, likewise, if the defendant had
a just defense he would not be denied by any artifice of the opportunity to
present it.
1926 SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 2.
102 See, e.g., Clark, The Handmaid ofJustice, 23 WASH. U.L.Q. 297 (1938) (dis-
cussing the importance of keeping procedure "in its modest position as a handmaid");
see also Subrin, supra note 89, at 961-73 (discussing Clark's role in the development of
the Federal Rules).
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including pre-trial conferences and decisions on motions for summary
judgment, to separate the wheat from the chaff.'0 3
It did not work out that way. One is reminded of an observation
by proceduralists' favorite author, Charles Dickens: "Here are all kinds
of employers wanting all sorts of servants, and all sorts of servants
wanting all kinds of employers, and they never seem to come
together."' o4
Of course, some judges did not want, and some still do not want,
any help.10 5 In any event, some of the amendments of the Eighties, and
some that may be in prospect, seem to me not an example of "failing
faith,"10 6 but of a reawakening faith, albeit a different one. I speak of
faith in the need for lawyers and clients to exercise some restraint in
the consumption of resources, private and public, and in the need for
federal trial judges to help them do so. Was that not the faith of the
people responsible for original Rule 1,107 Rule 11,0" Rules 12(b)(6)"0 9
103 See, e.g., Burbank, supra note 8, at 1476-77 & n.74; Carrington, Bogy, supra
note 52, at 2090-91; Marcus, Completing Equity's Conquest? Reflections on the Future
of Trial Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 725, 739
(1989); Smith, Judge Charles E. Clark and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 85
YALE L.J. 914, 918-19 (1976). For pre-trial as judicial discovery, see Sunderland, Dis-
covery Before Trial Under the New Federal Rules, 15 TENN. L. REV. 737, 753-57
(1939).
104 C. DICKENS, THE LIFE AND ADVENTURES OF MARTIN CHUZZLEWIT 641
(Penguin ed. 1968). And if you are not reminded, see J. BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUO-
TATIONS 495 (11 th ed. 1939).
105 See supra note 23.
106 Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L.
REV. 494 (1986). "Today, we should not be talking about the decline of adjudicatory
procedure, except perhaps as one would at a wake." Burbank, supra note 8, at 1479
(footnote omitted).
107 As originally promulgated by the Supreme Court, Rule 1 provided:
RULE 1. SCOPE OF RULES. These rules govern the procedure in the
district courts of the United States in all suits of a civil nature whether
cognizable as cases at law or in equity, with the exceptions stated in Rule
81. They shall be construed to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination of every action.
Rules of Civil Procedure for the District Courts of the United States, 308 U.S. 645,
663 (1938).
As originally promulgated by the Supreme Court, Rule 11 provided:
RULE 11. SIGNING OF PLEADINGS. Every pleading of a party repre-
sented by an attorney shall be signed by at least one attorney of record in
his individual name, whose address shall be stated. A party who is not
represented by an attorney shall sign his pleading and state his address.
Except when otherwise specifically provided by rule or statute, pleadings
need not be verified or accompanied by affidavit. The rule in equity that
the averments of an answer under oath must be overcome by the testimony
of two witnesses or of one witness sustained by corroborating circum-
stances is abolished. The signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate
by him that he has read the pleading; that to the best of his knowledge,
information, and belief there is good ground to support it; and that it is
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and 12(c), 10 Rule 16,1 Rule 30(b)," 2 and Rule 56?"'
not interposed for delay. If a pleading is not signed or is signed with intent
to defeat the purpose of this rule, it may be stricken as sham and false and
the action may proceed as though the pleading had not been served. For a
wilful violation of this rule an attorney may be subjected to appropriate
disciplinary action. Similar action may be taken if scandalous or indecent
matter is inserted.
Id. at 676.
109 As originally promulgated by the Supreme Court, Rule 12(b)(6) provided:
RULE 12. DEFENSES AND OBJECTIONS - WHEN AND How
PRESENTED - By PLEADING OR MOTION - MOTION FOR JUDGMENT
ON PLEADINGS.
(b)(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Id. at 677.
110 As originally promulgated by the Supreme Court, Rule 12(c) provided:
(c) MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS. After the plead-
ings are closed but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party
may move for judgment on the pleadings.
Id. at 678.
As originally promulgated by the Supreme Court, Rule 16 provided:
RULE 16. PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE; FORMULATING ISSUES. In any
action, the court may in its discretion direct the attorneys for the parties to
appear before it for a conference to consider
(1) The simplification of the issues;
(2) The necessity or desirability of amendments to the pleadings;
(3) The possibility of obtaining admissions of fact and of documents
which will avoid unnecessary proof;
(4) The limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
(5) The advisability of a preliminary reference of issues to a master
for findings to be used as evidence when the trial is to be by jury;
(6) Such other matters as may aid in the disposition of the action.
The court shall make an order which recites the action taken at the
conference, the amendments allowed to the pleadings, and the agreements
made by the parties as to any of the matters considered, and which limits
the issues for trial to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements of
counsel; and such order when entered controls the subsequent course of
the action, unless modified at the trial to prevent manifest injustice. The
court in its discretion may establish by rule a pre-trial calendar on which
actions may be placed for consideration as above provided and may either
confine the calendar to jury actions or to non-jury actions or extend it to
all actions.
Id. at 684.
As originally promulgated by the Supreme Court, Rule 30(b) provided:
RULE 30. DEPOSITIONS UPON ORAL EXAMINATION.
(b) ORDERS FOR THE PROTECTION OF PARTIES AND DEPONENTS. After
notice is served for taking a deposition by oral examination, upon motion
seasonably made by any party or by the person to be examined and upon
notice and for good cause shown, the court in which the action is pending
may make an order that the deposition shall not be taken, or that it may
be taken only at some designated place other than that stated in the notice,
or that it may be taken only on written interrogatories, or that certain
matters shall not be inquired into, or that the scope of the examination
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To be sure, the original rulemakers missed some opportunities to take
shall be limited to certain matters, or that the examination shall be held
with no one present except the parties to the action and their officers or
counsel, or that after being sealed the deposition shall be opened only by
order of the court, or that secret processes, developments, or research need
not be disclosed, or that the parties shall simultaneously file specified doc-
uments or information enclosed in sealed envelopes to be opened as di-
rected by the court; or the court may make any other order which justice
requires to protect the party or witness from annoyance, embarrassment,
or oppression.
Id. at 701.
113 As originally promulgated by the Supreme Courts, Rule 56 provided:
RULE 56. SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
(a) FOR CLAIMANT. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, coun-
terclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment may, at any
time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, move with or
without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in his favor upon
all or any part thereof.
(b) FOR DEFENDING PARTY. A party against whom a claim, coun-
terclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought
may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a sum-
mary judgment in his favor as to all or any part thereof.
(c) MOTION AND PROCEEDINGS THEREON. The motion shall be
served at least 10 days before the time specified for the hearing. The ad-
verse party prior to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The
judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that, ex-
cept as to the amount of damages, there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.
(d) CASE NOT FULLY ADJUDICATED ON MOTION. If on motion
under this rule judgment is not rendered upon the whole case or for all the
relief asked and a trial is necessary, the court at the hearing of the motion,
by examining the pleadings and the evidence before it and by interrogating
counsel, shall if practicable ascertain what material facts exist without
substantial controversy and what material facts are actually and in good
faith controverted. It shall thereupon make an order specifying the facts
that appear without substantial controversy, including the extent to which
the amount of damages or other relief is not in controversy, and directing
such further proceedings in the action as are just. Upon the trial of the
action the facts so specified shall be deemed established, and the trial shall
be conducted accordingly.
(e) FORM OF AFFIDAVITS; FURTHER TESTIMONY. Supporting and
opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively
that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein. Sworn
or certified copies of all papers or parts thereof referred to in an affidavit
shall be attached thereto or served therewith. The court may permit affi-
davits to be supplemented or opposed by depositions or by further
affidavits.
(f) WHEN AFFIDAVITS ARE UNAVAILABLE. Should it appear from
the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for reasons
stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court
may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to
permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to
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justice out of the eye of the beholder, as they surely underestimated the
willingness or ability of federal judges to resist the combined centrifugal
forces of lawyers in search of a claim or a fee and of the rhetoric of
reform.'" 4 But the original Federal Rules were transformed in the
courts just as surely as amended Rule 11 has been transformed. In the
latter case, what can and, I believe, should be regarded as a corrective
or mid-course adjustment instead is regarded by some as an instrument
for a change of course. The result is that one reform strategy, encour-
aging judges to manage litigation, is at risk of confusion with another,
encouraging people to avoid litigation."'
How else is one to view the recent pronouncement by the Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that "Rule 11 is a fee-shifting stat-
ute"?... Of course it is nothing of the sort, but the theoretical literature
indicates that fee-shifting can have a disproportionate impact on the
risk averse. 1  Moreover, we no longer need simply to speculate about
the disproportionate impact of Rule 11 on plaintiffs (or their lawyers)
and on civil rights plaintiffs (or their lawyers), although, as I have indi-
cated, we need to ask, and pursue the answers to, many more questions
raised by that information."' Theory is an irresponsible basis for law-
making about something as important as access to court, and it is espe-
cially irresponsible when the lawmaking involves judicial amendment of
be had or may make such other order as is just.
(g) AFFIDAVITS MADE IN BAD FAITH. Should it appear to the satis-
faction of the court at any time that any of the affidavits presented pursu-
ant to this rule are presented in bad faith or solely for the purpose of
delay, the court shall forthwith order the party employing them to pay to
the other party the amount of the reasonable expenses which the filing of
the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees,
and any offending party or attorney may be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Id. at 734-35.
114 See Burbank, supra note 8, at 1477-78.
115 Two [reform] strategies have dominated recent efforts of the rulemakers
and debate in the literature. One is to enhance the power of trial judges to
manage litigation. Another is to enhance incentives for people to avoid
litigation. Both represent steps in the flight from law.
Burbank, supra note 11, at 716 (footnotes omitted).
"" Hays v. Sony Corp., 847 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1988).
1.7 See, e.g., Rowe, Predicting the Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 139, 164-70 (1984); see also Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule
68 -Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 425, 436, 439 (1986) (impact on
risk-averse of proposals to deny attorney's fees to, or impose them on, those who refuse
offers of settlement).
For the results of an empirical study tending to confirm the disproportionate im-
pact of fee-shifting on the risk-averse, see Rowe & Vidmar, Empirical Research on
Offers of Settlement: A Preliminary Report (forthcoming in 1988 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS.).
118 See supra text accompanying notes 65-87.
19891
1948 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
a Rule that, in part because of access concerns, only barely escaped the
bright light of the democratic process."'
How else is one to view the blessing given by the same court to a
Rule 11 sanction imposed in a civil rights case "for failing to include
[in a complaint] factual allegations that would indicate the claim might
have merit"? 2 ' The court observed that "[i]f the file contains un-
privileged information that would rectify the factual deficiencies we
have noted, plaintiff's counsel's failure to include those facts warrants
the imposition of sanctions."'' Subsequent opinions by other panels of
that court have recognized the error of engrafting Rule 11 on Rule 8,12
but they also have imposed another requirement: to wit, that a court
impose sanctions even if it can think of a "good faith argument for the
extension, modification or reversal of existing law" but the attorney or
pro se litigant did not in fact make that argument' 23 The requirement
may make sense so long as the Rule is interpreted to reach only pre-
filing conduct and representations about that conduct. It does not, how-
ever, clearly make sense under a product approach-which assesses the
frivolousness of filed papers-at least one driven by concern for the
recoupment by litigants of "unjustified" costs.' 24
A conduct approach to amended Rule 11 should help to unravel
119 On July 26, the House passed a bill that would have delayed the effective date
of the 1983 amendments until December 1, 1983. See H.R. 3497, 98th Cong., 1st Sess.,
129 CONG. REc. H5560-62 (daily ed. July 26, 1983). In the Senate, the bill was held
at the desk until the close of business on Friday, July 29, see 129 CONG. REC S10,912
(daily ed. July 26, 1983), and on the latter date it was referred to the Senate Judiciary
Committee. See 129 CONG. REc. S11,169 (daily ed. July 29, 1983). The latter action
doomed the effort to delay the effective date because, in the absence of legislation, the
proposed Rules would go into effect, as they did, on Monday, August 1, 1983. See 129
CONG. REc. H5560 (daily ed. July 26, 1983).
Professor Miller, reporter to the Advisory Committee f6r the 1983 amendments,
observed that those rules "by the thinnest hair you can think of became effective on
August 1, 1983." He continued: "It was one of those death-defying cliff-hangers be-
cause a bill to delay their effectiveness was sitting in the well of the Senate on the
appropriate morning, but no one hauled it out." A. MILLER, supra note 5, at 1.
120 Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 771 F.2d 194, 206 (7th Cir. 1985).
121 Id.
121 See, e.g., Frantz v. United States Powerlifting Fed'n, 836 F.2d 1063, 1067-68
(7th Cir. 1987) ("Rule 11 requires not that counsel plead facts but that counsel know
facts after conducting a reasonable investigation-and then only enough to make it rea-
sonable to press litigation to the point of seeking discovery.")
121 See, e.g., In re Ronco, Inc., 838 F.2d 212, 218 (7th Cir. 1988).
12 There is, however, no clear dichotomy between conduct and product ap-
proaches. See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 20, 24-25. In the Seventh Cir-
cuit, for example, perceived deficiencies in either product or pre-filing conduct can lead
to Rule 11 sanctions. See, e.g., Frantz, 836 F.2d at 1065. Moreover, product may be
used as a basis for inference about conduct. See Brown v. Federation of State Med.
Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1436 (7th Cir. 1987). The message seems to be, in the words of a
television commercial, "one way or another, we're going to get you."
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the question of sanctions from questions on the merits. But even assum-
ing such an approach, we should be concerned about the impact of the
amended Rule on other Federal Rules and phases of litigation that im-
plicate the willingness and ability of people to seek redress for their
grievances in federal court and to have those grievances fairly
considered.
Professors James and Hazard have observed:
The incidence of the strike suit has led to proposals for
tightening the pleading rules. There has not been much sup-
port for returning to code pleading, and probably interests
associated with plaintiffs' causes are strong enough to block
such a change. However, something approximating that re-
sult may be in progress indirectly. Rule 11 of the federal
rules was amended in 1983 to require that all motions and
pleadings be based on the subscribing attorney's "belief
formed after reasonable inquiry [that] it is well grounded in
fact. . . ." As some decisions suggest, this language could be
administered to require the pleading to show that it is "well
grounded in fact." It is difficult to see how such a require-
ment could be complied with except by alleging the factual
grounds of the claim. This is a move in the direction of code
pleading. 25
More recently, the Harvard Law Review has published student
work treating the issues in considerable depth.' 26 The author attributes
the liberal pleading and discovery provisions of the original Federal
Rules to the realists' rejection of formalism, their perception of the in-
determinacy of legal doctrine, and their faith in the power of facts. The
author sees in amended Rule 11, at least as interpreted, a threat to both
this philosophy and to the Rules we inherited in 1938, and argues that
Rule 11 should be interpreted in such a way as to preserve both.
Having asserted at the outset that the 1983 amendments to Rule
11 "alter the balance struck by the original Federal Rules scheme be-
tween open access to court and efficient disposition of claims,"'2 7 the
author later (much later) acknowledges that they need not be read to do
so and indeed that the Advisory Committee took some pains to mini-
mize that risk.'28 Similarly, the author equates the amended Rule's re-
lfl F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3.11, at 154-55 (3d ed. 1985)
(footnotes omitted).
12 See generally Note, Plausible Pleadings: Developing Standards for Rule 11
Sanctions, 100 HARV. L. REV. 630 (1987).
127 Id. at 630.
128 See id. at 647-51.
1989]
1950 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
quirement of a reasonable factual inquiry with a requirement of plead-
ing facts, burying in a footnote the assertion that the former is
"ctantamount" to the latter because, in the absence of a hearing, lawyers
"are under pressure to allege whatever factual support is available to
them."12
Again, the author posits a dichotomy (in the Rule, not just the
decisions interpreting it) between product and conduct, one that is arti-
ficial and appears designed to further the author's thesis rather than to
"clarify."1 ' Finally, the author's assertion that "[in the absence of an
explicit mandate to abandon the commitments of legal realism by
changing the standard of pleading and the role of other pretrial proce-
dural mechanisms, rule 11 must be read consistently with both its own
terms and the established procedural scheme" '' is simply and extraor-
dinarily naive.
Withal, the Note should stimulate thinking about some important
issues. We need not resolve whether those responsible for the original
Federal Rules embraced the realist faith, and the evidence does not
support the notion that they intended to permit the filing of a complaint
on a wish and a prayer.'32 The Enabling Act empowers the Supreme
Court to change the Rules and to do so according to whatever proce-
dural philosophy appeals to the Justices. Whether the rulemakers in-
tended to "alter the balance" in the 1983 amendments is essentially a
factual inquiry on which the Advisory Committee Notes shed light, and
one's conclusion on that question is appropriately subject to normative
debate.
The requirement of a reasonable factual inquiry in amended Rule
11 need not be interpreted as inconsistent with the liberal pleading
rules and, because those rules were not themselves amended in 1983, it
probably should not be. Nor need the requirement be interpreted as
inconsistent with the discovery rules, although in evaluating the latter
assertion, it may be important to take account of the 1980 and 1983
amendments to the discovery rules.' 33 "Discovery was hardly intended
to enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without
wits or on wits borrowed from the adversary."'3 4 There is no reason to
12 Id. at 635 n.25.
130 See id. at 642 n.64.
131 Id. at 648.
132 See C. CLARK, CODE PLEADING 146-48 (2d ed. 1947); F. JAMES & G. HAZ-
ARD, supra note 125, § 3.11, at 152; Rosenberg, supra note 6, 2205-07; infra text
accompanying notes 135 & 150.
133 See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) (added in 1980); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) & 26 (g)
(amended and added, respectively, in 1983).
134 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 516 (1947) (Jackson, J., concurring).
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believe that the original Advisory Committee intended to relieve liti-
gants of responsibility to make any pre-discovery inquiry into the facts;
indeed, original Rule 11 seemingly contradicts such a notion.135
Some courts, in fact, are imposing sanctions without an opportu-
nity to be heard on the question of the reasonableness of the pre-filing
factual inquiry.1"6 The problem can and should be corrected on review
by a higher court, recognizing the political pressures under which the
Advisory Committee operated and the practical pressures under which
federal trial courts operate.1
37
Lurking beneath the surface of the student author's arguments
about the factual component of the Rule 11 certification is the concern
that the new requirement will have a disproportionately adverse effect
on litigants (namely plaintiffs) with limited resources.3 A formal re-
sponse to that concern might invoke the Supreme Court's dismissal of a
similar argument made in connection with the discovery rules. 39 But
135 For the text of original Rule 11, see supra note 108.
Rule 11 deals with the Signing of Pleadings. There, if you read down
through it, you will see that, in general, verification, or taking of oath, is
not required, but, on the other hand, the signing by the attorney is a cer-
tificate of substantially the same effect, perhaps a little stronger than any
mere formal oath would be.
PROCEEDINGS OF THE CLEVELAND INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 236 (1938) [here-
inafter CLEVELAND INSTITUTE] (statement of Charles E. Clark); see also PROCEED-
INGS OF THE WASHINGTON, D.C. INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES 52 (1939) [herein-
after WASHINGTON D.C. INSTITUTE] ("[T]he signature of the lawyer, carrying with it
certain responsibilities, is much more important and worthwhile than an oath . . ").
In this age of sanctions, we may forget a distinction between the duties imposed by a
rule and the consequences of failing to perform those duties. Clark was very much
aware of that distinction in connection with Rule 11, which provided for attorney disci-
pline only in the event of "wilful violation." See WASHINGTON D.C. INSTITUTE,
supra, at 72; see also PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK SYMPOSIUM ON FEDERAL
RULES 298 (1939) (general denials to partially incorrect averments contravene the
spirit of Rule 11).
138 See United States v. Childers, 846 F.2d 74 (4th Cir. 1988) (text in
WESTLAW and LEXIS); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 25-29.
13 See Burbank, supra note 7, at 1009-10 & n.60; infra text accompanying notes
187-90.
138 See Note, supra note 126, at 642-43.
As the Supreme Court said in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947):
But framing the problem in terms of assisting individual plaintiffs in
their suits against corporate defendants is unsatisfactory. Discovery con-
cededly may work to the disadvantage as well as to the advantage of indi-
vidual plaintiffs. Discovery, in other words, is not a one-way proposition.
It is available in all types of cases at the behest of any party, individual or
corporate, plaintiff or defendant. The problem thus far transcends the sit-
uation confronting this petitioner. And we must view the problem in light
of the limitless situations where the particular kind of discovery sought by
petitioner might be used.
Id. at 507.
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the Court's dismissal was itself a formal response, necessitated by the
trans-substantive structure of the Federal Rules and the danger of
opening up the possibility of differential substantive impact. 40 Aware-
ness of the same imperatives may explain the Advisory Committee's
failure to address concern about differential impact on the poor after it
was raised in response to the 1981 proposal to amend Rule 11.11' The
Third Circuit Task Force similarly does not address the question at
any length, but it does encourage others to pursue it.'42
One avenue of escape from this dilemma would be to consider a
client's or a lawyer's resources in judging the reasonableness of a pre-
filing factual inquiry. An advantage of a conduct approach to Rule 11
is that it brings to the surface resource questions that tend to be buried
by a product approach.' 43 Yet, once recognized, the relevance of fi-
nances presumably would have to be extended to the legal component
of the certification.' 44 Moreover, before proceeding down this avenue,
one would want very carefully to consider both the realities and the
doctrinal framework of litigation finance. From that perspective, one
might conclude that the problem, if it exists, should be solved directly
(that is, by providing adequate funding of legal aid) and that otherwise
lawyers should not be permitted to hedge their bets when accepting
cases on a contingent fee basis or in the expectation of recovering fees
under an exception to the American Rule.145
140 It is interesting but not surprising, see supra text accompanying notes 51-63,
77-87, to find Professor Carrington invoking this passage. See Carrington, Bogy, supra
note 52, at 2080.
141 See Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, Analysis of Comments Regarding
Committee's Proposed Amendments to Rules 7 and 11, at 2-3 (Dec. 1981) [hereinafter
Analysis of Comments] (copy available from author).
142 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 72.
143 See id.
See Singh v. Curry, 122 F.R.D. 27, 29-30 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (refusing to impose
Rule 11 sanctions for failure to find very recent appellate cases available, if at all, only
on computer or through advance sheets). Compare Hays v. Sony Corp., 847 F.2d 412,
419 (7th Cir. 1988) (Rule 11 has an objective standard and makes no allowance for the
particular circumstances of an attorney) with Muthig v. Brant Point Nantucket, Inc.,
838 F.2d 600, 605 (1st Cir. 1988) (considering as possible mitigating circumstances
"against a stringent application of Rule 11" whether attorney is an "understaffed sole
practitioner seeking to aid a client who has been hurt by the defendant but who is
uncertain about the exact legal vehicle for redress . . . [or] trying to make new law"
rather than "associated with a major law firm with all the attendant resources").
145 But cf. Cappelletti & Garth, A Comparative Conclusion, in XVI INTERNA-
TIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW 6-447 to 6-450 (M. Cappelletti ed.
1984).
The adversary system in its pure form assumes that each side will be rep-
resented equally, therefore necessitating no intervention by the court. Con-
sistent with this view, it can be asserted that high quality legal aid is the
only way to redress inequalities in litigation resources. Equal access to
lawyers should thus lead to the adversary system at its best. The problem
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The Note also raises concerns about amended Rule 1 l's require-
ment of a reasonable legal inquiry. Here again, one need not accept the
assertion that the original Federal Rules were animated by an unadul-
terated realist view of the factual contingency of law. On the other
hand, as the author observes, there is an inescapable connection be-
tween the factual and legal components of the Rule 11 certification.146
Requiring a plaintiff or her attorney to certify after reasonable inquiry
that, "to the best of [her] knowledge . . . ," a complaint is well-
grounded in fact necessarily imports a judgment about the relevance of
facts under a legal theory. It also may be true, as the author asserts,
that "[t]o meet the liberal standard of pleading, a complaint need not
have settled on a legal theory, nor even have articulated one, as long as
the complaint identifies the transaction or occurrence upon which its
claims are based."14 The crucial question, however, is whether the
plaintiffs lawyer (or a pro se plaintiff) must have conceived a legal
theory before filing, even if it is not laid out in the paper filed. The
concerns arising from an affirmative answer to that question are not
only that it may be inconsistent with the power of federal judges to
"decide cases on the basis of their own research and analysis of the
issues rather than relying on any interpretation advocated by the law-
yer." 48 Because, for most mortals, creativity is a factually contingent
enterprise, the process of extending, modifying, or (to a lesser extent)
reversing existing law is at the mercy of the available facts. In other
words, the existence of liberal discovery has played an important role in
legal development over the past fifty years.
1 49
As to the first concern-the role of federal judges in preserving
possibly meritorious cases against early dismissal-it seems no more
likely that the framers of the original Federal Rules contemplated a
plaintiff without a legal theory than they did a plaintiff without
facts. 5 Moreover, the Advisory Committee Note to amended Rule 11
quite clearly contemplates a preconceived legal theory. 51 On the other
hand, Supreme Court decisions concerning dismissals under Rule
is that, outside of perhaps SWEDEN, no legal aid system commits enough
resources to ensure that all those who cannot afford a lawyer will have
access to one.
Id. at 6-448.
148 See Note, supra note 126, at 637.
147 Id. at 641 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
148 Id. at 641 n.62.
149 See Friedenthal, A Divided Supreme Court Adopts Discovery Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 806, 818-19 (1981).
150 See, e.g., CLEVELAND INSTITUTE, supra note 135, at 226-27; Rosenberg,
supra note 6, at 2205-07.
1" See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note.
19891
1954 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
12(b)(6) certainly permit, if they do not require, federal trial judges to
exercise independent judgment about the legal viability of a complaint,
particularly one filed by a pro se plaintiff.'52 It seems unlikely that
many federal judges would impose sanctions for filing a complaint that
had been sustained against a 12(b)(6) motion on the ground that the
judge had to come up with the theory independent of the efforts of
counsel.' 53 A more realistic risk associated with this tension is that
some federal judges will see in amended Rule 11 positive direction not
to exercise such independent judgment, or at least an excuse for not
doing so. The result would be managerial judging in only one
direction."'
The second concern-the role of discovery in legal develop-
ment-is related to the first in that there is no logical entailment of the
1983 amendments -that should affect the number of cases proceeding to
discovery. Here, however, one should add to the risk discussed above
the risk that judges will see in the 1980 and 1983 amendments to the
discovery rules additional counterweights to arguments predicated on
the alleged intent behind the original Rules or experience under them.
That might be unfortunate. The Advisory Committee Note to amended
Rule 26(b) cautions that "the court must be careful not to deprive a
party of discovery that is reasonably necessary to afford a fair opportu-
nity to develop and prepare the case.' 5 5 The Note to Rule 26(g) states
that the certification duty imposed by that Rule "is not meant to dis-
courage or restrict necessary and legitimate discovery." 56 Perhaps,
however, our notions of fairness or of "legitimate discovery" have
changed. 5
152 See Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976);
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46
(1957).
153 But see supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
154 Delays at the expense of one or both parties, unequal advocacy, and
unintentional lapses in the development of crucial facts, all contribute to
unjust results and inappropriate settlements. If our goal is more than pro-
cedural equality in the abstract-an equal freedom to control the proceed-
ings - we should be hesitant to discard the potential advantages of judges
who depart somewhat from the traditional passive role. One might sug-
gest, however, that litigation involving unequal parties belongs in alterna-
tives to the courts; the court ideal must be preserved intact. That question,
however, then leads to a different kind of concern. For whom do our ordi-
nary courts exist?
Cappelletti & Garth, supra note 145, at 6-449.
155 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) advisory committee note.
158 FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g) advisory committee note.
157 On fairness, see Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation
Process, 94 YALE L.J. 1643, 1644-46 (1985). But see Burbank, supra note 8, at 1482-




Rule 1 speaks of "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action." 158 The concern that too much federal litigation was
protracted and expensive, with consequences for litigants, prospective
litigants, and the courts, was a major animating force behind the 1980
and 1983 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 159 In
amending Rule 11, the rulemakers hoped that it would serve "as a
healthy deterrent against costly meritless maneuvers."O6 They also
were concerned, however, about arguments that any benefits in that
regard would be offset, if not swamped, by the costs of litigating Rule
11 issues, so-called satellite litigation. 6' In addition, they could not ig-
nore critics who, refusing to confine the cost-benefit calculus to the
realm of judicial administration, claimed that the costs of the Rule
would include chilling zealous but legitimate advocacy, with conse-
quences for legal development, and poisoning relationships between
lawyers and clients, lawyers and lawyers, and lawyers and judges.
6 2
The debate that attended the proposal to amend Rule 11 in 1981
continues today. Thus far, it too often has been a debate characterized
by "cosmic anecdote[s]"' 1 3 on the one hand and confident assertions on
the other, both largely uninformed by data, except perhaps a selective
reading of published opinions. Yet, even viewed in gross, published
opinions are not a reliable index of what is happening in district courts,
at least in the Third Circuit. Only 9.1% of the decisions on Rule 11
Foreword, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 647, 651 (1981) Subrin, supra note 21, at 2023-26;
WAeinstein, supra note 10, at 1915-16.
1"I FED. R. Civ. P. 1. This was one of the "selling points" of the Rules Enabling
Act. See 1926 SENATE REPORT, supra note 18, at 2 ("Third, [the Federal Rules]
would tend toward the speedier and more intelligent disposition of the issues presented
in law actions and toward a reduction in the expense of litigation").
159 See A. MILLER, supra note 5, at 1-11. Judge Patrick Higginbotham cautions:
A more efficient process is always an important goal of procedural rules.
But failing to identify the policy choices that attend procedural alternatives
skews the decision-making process by understating the stakes and inviting
a judicial exercise of legislative function. Broad jurisdictional rules, of
course, carry a heavy political charge, but it is not hard to find less explo-
sive examples of ignored social choice in rule changes.
Higginbotham, Playing by the Rules (Book Review), 75 A.B.A. J. 118, 119 (1989).
160 Memorandum from Hon. Walter R. Mansfield to Hon. Edward T. Gignoux,
97 F.R.D. 190, 192 (1983).
161 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee note; Burbank, supra note 7, at
1009-10 & n.60.
16I See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 83-87; Analysis of Comments,
supra note 141, at 2-3; supra note 49 and accompanying text. The Advisory Commit-
tee apparently did ignore, in the sense that it did not address, concerns about additional
barriers to the poor. See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
163 A. MILLER, supra note 5, at 11.
19891
1956 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
issues in the period June 30, 1987 through July 1, 1988 (during which
the Third Circuit Task Force collected data) have been, or are sched-
uled to be, published in Federal Supplement or Federal Rules Deci-
sions. Only 39.1% of those decisions are available on Lexis. Moreover,
although the published decisions would suggest that sanctions are im-
posed in 40% of the cases in which a Rule 11 issue is raised (by motion
or sua sponte), the actual percentage for the survey period was
19.8%.164
From its questionnaires, surveys, and interviews, the Task Force
found evidence of widespread effects on the pre-filing conduct of law-
yers practicing in the Third Circuit, such as enhanced pre-filing factual
and legal inquiry, of the sort desired by the rulemakers, as well as
evidence of other benefits, including effects on settlement or voluntary
dismissal and the perceived effectiveness of warnings by judges issuing
them. 65
As to the directly associated costs of these benefits, the Task Force
found that Rule 11 motions are not routine in the Third Circuit. In a
one-year period, we could identify such motions in only approximately
one half of one percent of all civil cases.' 66 Moreover, on the basis of
(1) data gathered from interviews with lawyers relating to the time de-
voted to the Rule 11 issues and to the cost of litigating those issues, (2)
data on the procedures used in resolving, and the modes of disposition
of, Rule 11 issues by trial judges, and (3) data on the costs of appeals,
the Task Force concluded that the directly associated costs were not, at
least during the survey period, clearly incommensurate with the proba-
ble benefits.1
67
The Task Force also concluded that, although some other costs of
Rule 11 are not presently a source of serious concern in the Third
Circuit,' 6 8 certain collateral consequences of the Rule, such as its im-
pact on the cost or availability of professional liability insurance, are
imperfectly understood and may well increase significantly in the fu-
ture.169 For that reason alone, the Task Force is concerned that, even if
the net of costs and benefits in the Third Circuit were clear today,
which it is not, a similar Task Force might reach a different conclusion
in three years.'
7 0
16 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 45, 59.
165 See id. at 75-77. The ambiguity of some of these findings is discussed in id. at
76, 84. See also infra text accompanying notes 197-98.
116 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 60.
167 See id. at 77-83, 95.
168 See id. at 83-88.
1e9 See id. at 88-92.
170 See id. at 96.
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If the net of benefits and costs of amended Rule 11 is unclear
today in the Third Circuit, where Rule 11 motions are not routine,
where the prevailing attitude toward sanctions in general is hardly one
of embrace," 1 and where the Court of Appeals has issued a series of
opinions designed to ensure that the Rule is "reserved for only excep-
tional circumstances," ' 2 what of other circuits with different attitudes
towards and approaches to sanctions and Rule 11? We lack reliable
empirical data, which is why the Task Force's first recommendation is
that "[a] similar study should be undertaken in a circuit with a differ-
ent reputation regarding, and (as evidenced by case law) different nor-
mative perspectives on, Rule 11 sanctions."' 3
It is possible, however, to speculate what such a study might find,
or at least to formulate hypotheses for testing, based on a consideration
of alternative normative perspectives on Rule 11.1"4 As an example, my
personal speculation is that such a study in the Seventh Circuit might
confirm the worst fears of Rule 1l's critics. This is a Circuit, after all,
whose district courts have been encouraged to enforce Rule 11 "to the
hilt"1 5 and required to explain the denial of Rule 11 motions that are
judged "serious" according to, among other things, the amount of
money they seek."' It is, moreover, a Circuit whose lawyers are en-
couraged, and whose district judges are required, to test legal papers
for frivolousness, all in furtherance of the supposed' goal of compensa-
tion for the imposition of "unjustified" costs. 177 It is, finally, a Circuit
that encourages appeals from the denial of Rule 11 motions, in part
because the judges have not been able to agree on the standard of ap-
pellate review.11 8
171 See ABA SECTION OF LITIGATION, SANCTIONS: RULE 11 AND OTHER POW-
ERS 50-52 (2d ed. 1988); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 25, 39, 45.
172 Morristown Daily Record, Inc. v. Graphic Communications Union, 832 F.2d
31, 32 n.1 (3d Cir. 1987); Teamsters Local Union No. 430 v. Cement Express, Inc.,
841 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 128 (1988); see also Gaiardo v.
Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 483 (3d Cir. 1987).
173 TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 96.
174 See Rubin, supra note 4, at 1891-1904.
175 Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 802 F.2d 247,
255 (7th Cir. 1986).
171 See Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1084 (7th Cir.
1987), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988); see also Tarkowski v. County of Lake,
775 F.2d 173, 176 (7th Cir. 1985). (Rule 11 and § 1988). But see Wojan v. General
Motors Corp., 851 F.2d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 1988).
'7 See supra text accompanying note 39.
178 See, e.g., FDIC v. Tekfen Constr. & Installation Co., 847 F.2d 440, 443 (7th
Cir. 1988) (recognizing that "[o]ur own opinions have not always been models of clar-
ity" on the standard of review in Rule 11 cases). After this paper was delivered, the
Court of Appeals ordered rehearing en banc of an appeal for the purpose of determin-
ing "which standard should be applied in reviewing [Rule 11] sanctions imposed by the
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The combination of a product approach to the interpretation of
Rule 1 1's certification standard, a compensatory perspective, and judi-
cial embrace of sanctions should provide a powerful incentive for law-
yers and clients to seek such sanctions when they prevail on the mer-
its. 17 19 If, as the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has opined,
"[iln even a close case, . . . it [is] extremely unlikely that a judge, who
has already decided that the law is not as a lawyer argued it, will also
decide that the loser's position was warranted by existing law[,"' 80 it is
much more unlikely that the winner will so view the loser's position.181
In the Seventh Circuit, the winner's lawyer knows that judges are not
to preserve the loser from sanctions by themselves imagining an argu-
ment for "the extension, modification or reversal of existing law." '182
More important, the lawyer knows that if sanctions are imposed, they
are likely to be expenses, including attorney's fees. 83 As a result, in
many cases 8 the stakes are the entire bill for defending a lawsuit. In
such a climate, the winner's lawyer should ask whether it would be
professionally responsible not to recommend filing a Rule 11 motion. 85
Perhaps district courts are sending signals in conflict with those sent by
the vigorous proponents of fee-shifting sanctions on the court of ap-
peals, but to what effect in light of the incentives to appeal a denial of
sanctions ?1
86
district court." Mars Steel Corp. v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust, No. 88-
1554 (7th Cir. Feb. 16, 1989).
1'l See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 73-74.
180 Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d 1531, 1540 (9th
Cir. 1986).
181 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 62.
182 See supra text accompanying notes 123-24.
181 Even in the Third Circuit, whose Court of Appeals has emphasized the availa-
bility of non-monetary sanctions, see Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 835 F.2d 479, 482-83 (3d
Cir. 1987); Lieb v. Topstone Indus., Inc., 788 F.2d 151, 157-58 (3d Cir. 1986),
twenty-one of twenty-seven sanctions imposed in the survey period were monetary,
eighteen of which were made payable to another party. See TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 36-37. Moreover, fourteen of the eighteen expense-shifting sanctions
were calculated on an attorney's fee model. See id. at 113-14.
184 Complaints were the object of 50% (70/140) of Rule 11 motions and sua
sponte impositions in the Task Force's survey period. See TASK FORCE REPORT at
110; see also supra note 69 and accompanying text.
18 Cf Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717, 758 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (pro-
fessional ethics may require a defendant's counsel to seek waiver of attorney's fees as a
condition of settlement in a civil rights case).
188 See supra text accompanying notes 174-78; infra text accompanying notes
194-95. For Seventh Circuit cases reversing denials of Rule 11 sanctions by trial courts
or requiring consideration of such sanctions, see Fred A. Smith Lumber Co. v. Edidin,
845 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1988); S.A. Auto Lube, Inc. v. Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc., 842 F.2d
946 (7th Cir. 1988); Frantz v. United States Powerlifting Fed'n, 836 F.2d 1063 (7th
,Cir. 1987); Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073 (7th Cir. 1987),
cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988); Shrock v. Alton Nurses Registry, 810 F.2d 658
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A study might find, in other words, that Rule 11 motions are
made much more frequently in the Seventh Circuit than they are in the
Third. It seems less clear to me, however, what comparative conclusion
would emerge as to directly associated costs, including the costs of satel-
lite litigation. Difference in frequency of invocation by parties (and of
sua sponte imposition) is not the only variable. Indeed, one attraction
of a product approach to, and a possible consequence of a compensatory
perspective on, Rule 11 is procedural minimalism in the imposition of
sanctions. 1 7 But, I expect, the Supreme Court eventually will put an
end to the notion that a person sanctioned under Rule 11 is not entitled
to prior notice and opportunity to be heard because a hearing would be
"pointless" '8 or because a motion for reconsideration is an adequate
substitute. 89 Moreover, it is open to doubt whether a sanction-first-
ask-questions-later procedure is efficient even taking a narrow view of
costs. Lawyers and their clients have a nasty habit of seeking reconsid-
eration when they have not been heard, and even an opinion on recon-
sideration may not dissuade them from taking an appeal, perhaps be-
cause they have not been persuaded that the reconsideration process
was more than a feint.
190
In any event, whatever savings result from procedural minimalism
in the imposition of sanctions in the Seventh Circuit may be eaten by
the costs of litigating and deciding Rule 11 motions that are denied and
by the costs of appeals. Viewing Rule 11 as a "fee-shifting statute" '
and assimilating it to no fewer than three torts'92 have led to the impu-
tation of rights to a party seeking Rule 11 sanctions and the imposition
of a duty of explanation on district judges in the Seventh Circuit. 93
Moreover, even a formally deferential standard of appellate review, in
the hands of some judges applying it, can only encourage those ag-
(7th Cir. 1987); Dreis & Krump Mfg. v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 802 F.2d
247 (7th Cir. 1986); Tarkowski v. County of Lake, 775 F.2d 173 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Rule 11 and § 1988).
187 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 26-27, 73-74.
Is See Hill v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 814 F.2d 1192, 1202 (7th Cir. 1987) (discuss-
ing FED. R. APP. P. 38); see also United States v. Childers, 846 F.2d 74 (4th Cir.
1988) (text in WESTLAW and LEXIS) (Rule 11). But see TASK FORCE REPORT,
supra note 1, at 27-29.
188 See Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., Inc., 771 F.2d 194, 206 (7th Cir. 1985).
But see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 32-33.
190 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 33, 81.
191 Hays v. Sony Corp., 847 F.2d 412, 419 (7th Cir. 1988).
182 See id. at 418 ("Rule 11 defines a new form of legal malpractice"); Szabo
Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987) (abuse of
process and malicious prosecution), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988).
193 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 35-36; supra text accompanying
note 176.
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grieved by a deprivation of their right to compensation to seek re-
view."" Finally, it cannot be long before the Seventh Circuit adds to
the incentives by overtly approving what it, in effect, has endorsed al-
ready: the prospect of expenses on appeal if litigants are successful in
challenging the denial of Rule 11 sanctions.
1 95
But all of this speaks to costs. What of benefits? I expect that a
survey of lawyers practicing in the Seventh Circuit would find effects
on practice even more widespread than the effects the Task Force
found in the Third Circuit."9 ' I hope that those conducting the study
would be more sophisticated in their instrument design than we
were.1 97 In addition, it is essential not to equate evidence of effects on
practice, such as counselling clients not to file complaints or other pa-
pers, effects on settlement, or effects of warnings, with benefits. 98 In-
deed, even an effect as apparently benign as enhanced pre-filing legal
inquiry may be misleading. At some point, such inquiry may not be
justified, particularly in light of the rate at which cases are settled. It
seems to me that this point is likely to be reached as often in the Sev-
enth Circuit as anywhere else in the country, because some judges there
seem "intent on, or indifferent to the implications of, using the Rule to
mold the bar in their own image."19'
The Third Circuit Task Force was reassured that most of the ef-
fects on practice noted by respondents to its attorney questionnaire that
184 See Brown v. Federation of State Med. Bds., 830 F.2d 1429, 1434 (7th Cir.
1987) (asserting that previous decisions had applied a de novo standard of review with-
out discussion).
195 See Hays, 847 F.2d at 419; S.A. Auto Lube, Inc. v. Jiffy Lube Int'l, Inc., 842
F.2d 946,'950-51 (7th Cir. 1988). But see TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 49-
52, 98-100.
19' See supra text accompanying note 165.
197 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 148.
199 See id. at 76-77, 84-86; supra text accompanying note 165.
TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 21; see, e.g., Hays, 847 F.2d at 419
("A lawyer who lacks relevant expertise must either associate with him a lawyer who
has it, or must bone up on the relevant law at every step along the way in recognition
that his lack of experience makes him prone to error."); Thornton v. Wahl, 787 F.2d
1151, 1154 (7th Cir. 1986) ("Rule 11 requires counsel to study the law before repre-
senting its contents to a federal court").
The approach revealed in Parts IV and V of the majority opinion
effectively transforms Rule 11 from a protector against frivolous litigation,
a boon to the parties and the courts, into a fomenter of derivative litiga-
tion, a mine for unwary parties and overzealous courts. In addition, under
this approach the judicial process becomes a task not unlike the grading of
law school examinations. Presumably the submissions of the parties are to
be marked on a scale of "A" through "F". Anything falling on the far side
of "C" merits not only loss of one's case but loss of one's shirt as well.
Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d 1073, 1085 (7th Cir. 1987)
(Cudahy, J., concurring and dissenting), cert. dismissed, 108 S. Ct. 1101 (1988).
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could be taken as evidence of benefits should be so taken. For example,
although 26% of the respondents indicated that, in their view, the
amended Rule had chilled legal development, 74% perceived no such
effect. Moreover, only five percent indicated that it had affected their
practice in seeking extension or change in the law.200 Would the same
be true in the Seventh Circuit, where plaintiffs and their lawyers at
least must worry about, if not expect, an aggressive approach to Rule
11 sanctions and where they risk routine and potentially devastating
expense-shifting sanctions if they guess wrong about judicial reactions
to the papers they file?201 The question refers to "plaintiffs and their
lawyers" because I would expect the differential impact of the Rule on
that group to be even greater in the Seventh Circuit than it is in the
Third,02 assuming district court judges practice what some appellate
judges preach. Obviously, the study I have in mind should pay close
attention to civil rights plaintiffs and, in particular, to § 1983 plaintiffs,
for whom a product approach and a compensatory perspective pose
special difficulties.20 3 I hope that it also would attempt to answer ques-
tions about differential impact on the poor.
204
Finally, the Seventh Circuit study I recommend may be able to
shed additional light on other collateral consequences (costs) of Rule
11. The Task Force's interviews for the Third Circuit study did not
support the notion that expense-shifting (or other monetary) sanctions
are viewed as "only money,"20 5 a notion that evidently prompted a
1981 proposal to distinguish between expense-shifting and "sanc-
tions."' 20 6 But that may be a function of legal culture, which in turn
may play a major role in determining reputations and hence in affect-
ing the allocation of legal business.2 7 On the other hand, our inquiries
about the effect of Rule 11 on bar discipline suggest that it would be a
fruitful area of further study in the Seventh Circuit.20 8 In addition, it
may be a coincidence that the Task Force's only evidence of direct in-
quiry about Rule 11 on an application for professional liability insur-
200 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 84-85. As noted there, some par-
ticipants at the Third Circuit Judicial Conference regarded even the five percent figure
as cause for concern.
201 See supra text accompanying notes 39-43, 175-78, 182-86.
202 See supra text accompanying note 65.
203 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 71-72; see also supra text accom-
panying notes 71-76.
204 See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
205 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 26-27, 38.
20" See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 37-38; Analysis of Comments,
supra note 141, at 12.
1*7 See TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 37-38.
208 See id. at 89-90.
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ance came from a lawyer based in the Seventh Circuit.2"9 But, then
again, it may not be a coincidence.
As the Task Force observed, "[p]redictions are cheap."21 Perhaps
my speculations about the possible results of empirical study in the Sev-
enth Circuit are "cheap" in more ways than one, insofar as they flow
from normative analysis that is based on only some of the signals sent
by the Court of Appeals. But which signals are lawyers, who cannot
predict the makeup of an appellate panel, likely to regard as important
in the mix? In any event, my speculations will not have a direct effect
on lawyers' reputations and livelihoods, and presumably judges who
are quick to criticize lawyers can take a little criticism themselves.
However unfair they are, therefore, my speculations pale in comparison
with the unfairness of pursuing sanction theories in the absence of
facts, particularly theories that are in tension, if not direct conflict, with
basic premises of our legal system and with the articulated premises of
Rule 11.
V. CONCLUSION
The rhetoric of procedural reform has hardly changed over the
course of a century, but much of it is empty rhetoric."1' Many Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure are only superficially uniform and hence only
superficially trans-substantive.2" 2 Practice under them is not uniform,
and neither is it simple or predictable, because under them lies a vast
underworld of local rules, standing orders, and, ultimately, judicial dis-,
cretion.21 3 Adjudication on the merits has long since become a scarce
209 See id. at 90-91. The information was provided by a member of the Task
Force who practices in the Seventh Circuit.
210 Id. at 96.
211 A particularly depressing example of such rhetoric was invoked by Senator
Heflin in explaining the Senate Judiciary Committee's determination to preserve the
system by which valid Federal Rules supersede previously enacted statutes with which
they are inconsistent:
[The supersession clause] provides a sense of stability and uniformity to
the Federal Rules of Procedure. As one witness testified at the hearing: "It
has enabled the Rules of Procedure to be applied uniformly and has given
confidence to lawyers and to litigants that the mechanics of filing a com-
plaint, responding to an answer [sic], conducting discovery, and trying a
case, will not vary between one type of Federal lawsuit and another."
134 CONG. REC. S16,296 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1988) (citation omitted) (statement of Sen.
Heflin). The example is "particularly depressing," because the rhetoric was both
empty, see supra text accompanying notes 18-85, and effective. See Pub. L. No. 100-
702, § 401(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4648-50 (1988), quoted supra note 2. For further dis-
cussion of reform rhetoric, see Burbank, supra note 117,'at 427.
212 See supra text accompanying notes 18-23.
213 See supra text accompanying notes 18-23 & 88-90.
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commodity, and the quest for the "speedy and inexpensive determina-
tion of every action"214 threatens, in some quarters, to become synony-
mous with the "just" determination of those actions.
Viewed in the context of the amendments of the Eighties, Rule 11
is part of a transformation, characterized by enhanced awareness of the
folly of advertising apples as oranges and vice-versa. One question for
the future is whether, and to what extent, we shall continue to leave it
to individual federal judges (or judicial surrogates)215 to decide which is
which. Another is whether, whoever decides, the decision will be in-
formed by experience beyond that of the people making it. In respond-
ing to both questions, we should recall other transformations, both that
of the original Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and that of amended
Rule 11 itself. If those with the power of discretion are unwilling to
surrender any of it, let us at least hope that they will also seek the
power of facts.
214 FED. R. Civ. P. 1; see also supra text accompanying note 158.
215 See Silberman, Judicial Adjuncts Revisited: The Proliferation of Ad Hoc
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. R~v. 2131 (1989).
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701 Union Trust Building
Washington 5, D.C.
Dear Mr. Acheson:
You may recall that a suggestion out of the usual course was made
at our Committee meeting in Spring 1966. At that time we had com-
pleted action on our third set of Rule amendments, and were beginning
to see the end of the Discovery problem. We all realized that the exam-
ination of the Rules which had begun in 1960 was shortly going to
grind to a halt - a temporary halt, to be sure, but still a halt - and
we all had in our minds the question of quo vadis. In this setting, John
Frank (seconded by Charles Wright, and, I think, Bert Jenner) raised
the question whether our Committee should not turn its attention to
large procedural themes such as "delay in the courts" which in the end
are far more important than technical questions of Rule amendments.
It was left to me to think about the suggestion and make some
response to it. I assumed that I was allowed a generous moratorium,
but recently I have done what thinking I could, have spoken with my
colleagues at Harvard including Albert Sacks, and, on trips to New
York, Chicago, and New Haven, have had words, respectively, with
Maurice Rosenberg, Geoffrey Hazard (who directs research for the
American Bar Foundation), and Fleming James (whose most recent
procedural exploit was to bring out a very fine text, American Civil
Procedure).* Without rehearsing what was discussed at these pur-
posely desultory sessions, I would like to set out some impressions that
I derived from the talks.
1. Clearly it would be a mistake to try to run a project like the one
envisaged by John Frank according to our usual routine, with a Re-
porter working up a paper with proposals, and the Committee criticiz-
ing and reshaping the proposals and finally voting a solution. The sub-
ject matter would simply not lend itself to any such routine. Suppose
we tried to decide what to do about accident cases in relation to delay.
How would a Reporter attack this? To whom would our solution be




addressed, and with what claims of authority or validity?
The inappositeness of our regular procedure is obvious, but I want
to make the further point that our Committee ought to be careful about
lending its official sponsorship to a project in such a field as "delay"
even if a reasonable pattern of work, perhaps by other hands, could be
devised. Such a project would not be quite germane to our delegated
authority. And as soon as one gets into issues like delay, a "political"
element may enter. To involve the Committee in public debates of that
sort creates a possibility of putting at risk the reputation for impartial-
ity and scientific skill which the Federal rulemakers have been at pains
to build up since the 1930s. These are only cautionary words. I am not
suggesting that the Committee must take a completely hands-off atti-
tude toward all projects other than those bearing immediately on the
Rules.
2. Still considering questions of format, I should add that I do not
think it would make sense to dissipate the Frank suggestion by just
holding another conclave on an Arden House model. In fact there has
been just such a conclave on the subject of the courts, and a good one,
in the past couple of years, to which, as I recall, Professors Rosenberg
and Hazard made excellent contributions. At best an Arden House
meeting produces a summary of what is known or believed to date. It is
not a substitute for original research into dark places.
3. Thus the Frank suggestion seems to me finally to raise the
question whether we can imagine a research project in civil procedure,
under whatever auspices, that at-this particular stage of history might
claim to have large importance or promise.
It was instinct in the original suggestion that we should not play
around with mere gadgetry, or with merely visionary proposals, or with
the run of tired ideas regularly dusted off and advanced as cure-alls. In
one or another of these categories I would put ideas of changing the
balance between the written and oral elements of the procedure - e.g.
increased emphasis on summary judgement or like devices; installing
Masters to take the burden off judges during pretrial stages; abolishing
the constitutional requirement of jury trial; changing the law governing
allocation of expenses of litigation; and a hundred other notions that
pop up repeatedly in the literature and trade-talk of lawyers. (I have
dared to mention here some ideas listed by John Frank in a letter elab-
orating upon his own suggestion.) It is not that these ideas are all
transparently so poor as not to be entitled to study on their merits.
Some of them may well deserve study by someone. None of the usual
array, however, qualifies as the center of a research that might make an
important contribution to the progressive evolution of civil procedure,
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although some of them might be ultimately caught up as collateral
parts of such a research.
4. Upon consideration of various possibilities, I am personally at-
tracted by a basic research, both theoretic and empiric, with three inter-
locking phases or aspects as follows. I set these down flatly, with no
attempt at elaboration.
(a) The first phase of the research would try to answer the ques-
tion: Which quarrels under present-day conditions belong in the courts
(constituted more or less as the courts now are), and which do not?
This inquiry is in part philosophic, in part practical. Do "family" or
probate matters belong in the courts? One would finally ask the same
questions about accident cases. As the research found that particular
blocks of controversies are not suited to courts, it would have to go on
to answer the question where they do belong, and on what terms. The
inquiry could not stop short of substance. Thus changes in substantive
rules or other arrangements could affect the choice of the agency to
settle particular kinds of disputes, or even eliminate the disputes
altogether.
(b) The second phase would be an attempt to classify the various
types of court-litigated matters by their intrinsic qualities and functions
with a view to deciding whether the unitary court procedures now in
vogue could be deliberately altered to accommodate better to the several
types. The general advantages of a unitary or common procedure are
evident, but that may be overborne by other considerations in certain
classes of cases. As in (a) above, a study of this kind, while centering on
procedure, could not remain totally procedural. The various classes of
cases could be understood only if their substantive settings were appre-
ciated, and this means an analysis of the relevant social and economic
facts as well as the controlling material rules of law.
It would be well to attempt to sort out litigated cases on a variety
of bases besides the functional. For example, we have never pursued
the full implications of a decision that small cases should not be able to
claim the same refinements of procedure as big cases.
(c) The third phase of the study would be an attempt to apply
"systems analysis" (connected, I believe, with what was called "opera-
tions research" during the War) to the workings of the courts. I am in
the unhappy situation of not knowing exactly what is meant by systems
analysis, but I think we are all entitled to satisfy our natural curiosity
about what computers, flow charts, and the rest of the paraphernalia
could do in making the business of justice more efficient. As adjunct to
systems analysis, I would insist upon experimentation with live cases to
the extent that this would not involve illegal discriminations among
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litigants.
You will find in the recent report of the President's Crime Com-
mission a brief reference to an investigation into the workings of a Dis-
trict of Columbia court that qualifies as a "systems analysis" in my
lexicon and is quite impressive. (See The Challenge of Crime in a Free
Society, pp.257-59). Full-scale explorations on similar lines would, I
am sure, be very instructive.
5. If the research just outlined makes any appeal as being basic
and important, we still have the question just how it can be promoted
and carried out. This I will leave to the next chapter, if any, except to
note a Presidential recommendation bearing on the question that came
out at about the time I had finished my private deliberations. As part of
his message on Crime, the President proposed the creation of a "judi-
cial center" within the Administrative Office of United States Courts
which is (i) to conduct research and tests in judicial administration, and
(ii) to carry out programs of education and training for personnel in the
judicial branch, including judges. I do not know the exact origin of the
recommendation; it has been intimated that the Chief Justice inspired
it. Senator McClellan on February 8, 1967 introduced legislation (S.
915) to carry out the recommendation, and I annex the major provi-
sions of the bill. If the bill should pass, it is conceivable that the re-
search I have suggested could be carried out by or under the auspices of
the judicial center. Under the terms of the bill, I believe the judicial
center could perform effectively notwithstanding the fact that the deep-
est and most resistant problems lie on the State rather than on the Fed-
eral level. It is a matter for consideration just how our Committee could
give continuing help or support to the judicial center in the research.
I submit this letter as a basis for a discussion by the Committee if
you think a discussion would be profitable. I am taking the liberty of
sending copies to Messrs. Frank, Wright, and Jenner; if further distri-





cc: Mr. Frank, Mr. Jenner, Professor Wright
[Annex containing excerpts from S. 915, 90th Congress, 1st Session not
included.]
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